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ABSTRACT
Bad News Reporting on Troubled IT Projects:
The Role of Personal, Situational, and Organizational Factors
By

ChongWoo Park
August, 2007

Committee Chair:

Dr. Mark Keil

Major Academic Unit:

Computer Information Systems

An individual’s bad news reporting behavior has been studied from a number of
perspectives and has resulted in a variety of research streams including the MUM effect (or
reluctance to transmit bad news), whistle-blowing, and organizational silence. While many
scholars in different areas have studied reporting behavior, it has not been widely discussed in
the information systems literature. This dissertation research addresses an individual’s bad news
reporting behavior (and its antecedents) in the troubled IT project context.
Many social phenomena are multi-causal (Hollander 1971). The silence phenomenon
involved in an individual’s bad news reporting behavior is multi-causal too. While prior research
has identified many antecedents to the bad news reporting behavior, it has not provided any
systematic approach for categorizing them. In this dissertation, the antecedents are categorized
into three different levels: personal factors (i.e., individual-level factors), situational factors (i.e.,
project-level factors), and organizational factors. This research empirically investigates how the
antecedents at different levels affect (i.e., encourage or discourage) an individual’s decision to
report or not report bad news in the IT project context.
The dissertation follows a multi-paper model, and includes three independent, empirical
studies, each with its own research model focusing on personal, situational, and organizational
factors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation
According to KPMG’s recent survey on international IT project management (Zarrella et

al. 2005) which included more than 600 organizations across 22 countries, 49 percent of the
respondents had experienced at least one IT project failure in the past year. Although this is an
improvement from the company’s 2003 survey where 57% of the respondents experienced one
or more IT project failures in the previous year, the survey suggests that IT project failure is still
a widespread problem.
Why do IT projects fail? Many reasons have been identified over the years. IT project
escalation – continued commitment to a failing IT project – has been identified as an important
type or pattern of IT failure (Keil 1995). While some factors promoting project escalation have
been identified and investigated in the escalation literature (Keil 1995; Staw and Ross 1987), the
CONFIRM case represents one instance of an IT project failure in which an individual’s
reluctance to report bad news about the project and its true status appeared to lead to project
escalation and ultimately to project failure (Oz 1994). In the case of CONFIRM, the IT project
escalated as a result of technical and performance problems that were never brought to the
attention of senior management. Apparently, multiple project team members knew about these
problems, but chose not to disclose the true status of the project in a timely manner.
Cases such as CONFIRM raise two important research questions:
1. Why do people not report problems associated with troubled IT projects?
2. How do people decide whether or not to report problems?
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The first question can be answered by identifying the factors that affect an individual’s
reporting behavior, and the second one can be solved by investigating an individual’s decisionmaking steps for reporting.
Thus, the objective of this dissertation research is to better understand an individual’s
reporting behavior in the IT project context. In order to achieve this objective, this dissertation
examines 1) the factors that influence an individual’s reporting behavior – an individual’s
decision to report or not report, 2) the steps through which an individual makes a decision of
reporting or not, and 3) the ways in which those factors interact with the reporting decision steps.
More specifically, this dissertation addresses how the influential factors at three different levels
(i.e., personal, situational, and organizational factors) affect an individual’s bad news reporting
behavior within the rubric of the basic whistle-blowing model.

1.2

Relevant Literature
Although there have been several areas of study dealing with the phenomenon of

employee silence, they have adopted different foci and approaches to that phenomenon. The
different perspectives that have been employed are reflected in the range of labels (e.g., MUM
effect, whistle-blowing, and organizational silence) that are often associated with this area of
research. Each of these areas is described briefly below.
1.2.1

MUM Effect
It is commonly believed that people will be more reluctant to communicate information

which is negative rather than positive for the recipient. Rosen and Tesser (1970) have termed the
phenomenon of keeping Mum about Unpleasant Messages the MUM effect. They also conducted
a laboratory experiment to test the phenomenon and found a greater reluctance to communicate
bad news compared to good news. Many studies in the MUM effect literature have replicated

3

and reconfirmed these findings (Tesser et al. 1972). In addition, from their thorough literature
review, Tesser and Rosen (1975) showed great generality of the MUM effect across settings,
individuals, and messages, and argued that the MUM effect is a pervasive and systematic bias in
interpersonal communication. Thus, the MUM effect – an individual’s reluctance to report bad
news – may hold in various situations, independent of the context involved. The MUM effect
literature provides a robust theoretical and empirical foundation for understanding an
individual’s willingness to report bad news, which is the dependent variable of interest in this
dissertation.
In spite of its focus on the unpleasantness of messages as a driver behind the reporting
decision, the MUM effect literature has also discussed other determinants of the MUM effect.
Tesser and Rosen (1975, p. 200) suggest that people “may withhold the bad news out of selfconcern, out of concern for the recipient, or simply to comply with norms.” While the three
reasons seem to be at different levels, all of them basically belong to the individual’s perceptions
of the situations involved in terms of self, recipient, and society. Thus, the MUM effect literature
mainly introduces and discusses situational factors that can affect an individual’s reluctance or
willingness to report bad news. This dissertation examines the effects of several situational
factors that have not been specified in the MUM effect literature.
1.2.2

Whistle Blowing
Whistle-blowing can be seen as a form of prosocial behavior (Staub 1978), which is

positive social behavior that is intended to benefit both the whistle-blower and other persons in
the organization (Dozier and Miceli 1985). Whistle-blowers are defined as organization members
“who disclose illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employer to
persons or organizations who may be able to effect action” (Near and Miceli 1985, p. 6). From
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the definition above, whistle-blowing seems to focus more on reporting some wrongdoing, which
should be bad news to the organization. Thus, whistle-blowing per se can be regarded as one
form of bad news reporting. Although whistle-blowing (i.e. willingness to report) seems to be the
opposite of the MUM effect (i.e., reluctance to report), studies of whistle-blowing have discussed
not only why some observers of organizational wrongdoing choose to report it, but also why
others ignore it (i.e., decide to remain silent).
Dozier and Miceli (1985) introduced the basic whistle-blowing model based on Latane
and Darley’s (1970) bystander intervention framework, describing five decision steps, through
which individuals decide to blow the whistle or not to. They argued that once an individual is
aware of wrongdoing, he or she first decides whether or not the wrongdoing ought to be reported,
then considers whether he or she is responsible for taking action, which in turn influences his or
her blowing the whistle. The three steps from the whistle-blowing literature provide us with a
good approach to an individual’s decision-making steps for reporting. This dissertation has
adopted the basic whistle-blowing model to understand how an individual makes a decision of
reporting bad news or not.
The whistle-blowing literature also introduces potential variables that may affect the
whistle-blowing process, such as characteristics of the whistle-blower, the situation, the
organization, and the power relationships between the whistle-blower and the organization
(Miceli and Near 1992). More specifically, Dozier and Miceli (1985) suggest that personality
traits and situational variables leading to moral and ethical conflicts may be critical in
determining an individual’s whistle-blowing. This dissertation examines several potential
variables specified in the whistle-blowing literature.
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1.2.3

Organizational Silence
Morrison and Milliken (2000) have noted that “many organizations are caught in an

apparent paradox in which most employees know the truth about certain issues and problems
within the organization yet dare not speak that truth to their superiors.” They refer to this as
organizational silence. While this phenomenon has been discussed with different labels such as
whistle-blowing and MUM effect, organizational silence, which focuses more on collective-level
dynamics rather than an individual employee’s reporting decision, has recently received research
attention in the management literature (Morrison and Milliken 2003). In addition, organizational
silence represents a more inclusive approach to characterizing the silence phenomenon in an
organization. For example, while whistle-blowing seems to be limited to a wrongdoing situation,
the notion of organizational silence is not limited to any specific context, but covers widespread
withholding of information about potential problems or issues by employees (Morrison and
Milliken 2000). This dissertation research has adopted this inclusive approach from the
organizational silence literature in defining bad news reporting in organizational settings, i.e., not
limiting the origin of bad news to wrongdoing but extending it to any potential problems or
issues.
In addition to its inclusive approach to bad news reporting, the organizational silence
literature has identified organizational forces, rather than personal factors, that affect an
employee’s bad news reporting. Morrison and Milliken (2000) have theorized how silence
unfolds within organizations, but their model has not been empirically tested. Their model
suggests that managers’ fear of negative feedback and a set of implicit managerial beliefs give
rise to organizational structures/policies and managerial practices that impede the upward flow of
information, which contribute to a climate of silence (meaning widely shared perceptions among
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individuals that speaking up about problems or issues is fruitless and/or even dangerous). Such a
climate will lead to employee silence rather than voice. This dissertation research adopts and
tests some organizational forces specified as potential factors affecting employee silence or voice
in the organizational silence literature.

1.3

Overall Research Model and Three Studies
This dissertation is theoretically grounded in the literature introduced above. The MUM

effect studies mainly explain the phenomenon of bad news reporting (i.e., reluctance or
willingness to report bad news) per se, which is the ultimate dependent variable in this research.
The whistle-blowing literature provides grounding in an individual’s decision-making steps that
underlie the bad news reporting behavior, through which exogenous factors influence the
dependent variable. While the whistle-blowing literature deals with bad news reporting focusing
on wrongdoing, the organizational silence literature provides a more inclusive context of bad
news reporting by extending wrongdoing to potential problems or issues involved. All three
streams of literature have suggested that a variety of exogenous forces can influence bad news
reporting.
This dissertation suggests an overall research model of bad news reporting on troubled IT
projects as shown in Figure 1.1. The discussions and findings from the literature have been
synthesized to better understand bad news reporting, in terms of its decision steps (from whistleblowing theory) and its context (from the organizational silence literature). In order to provide
some systematic understanding of the influential factors on bad news reporting, this dissertation
adopts a multilevel approach to categorizing the factors in the overall research model.
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Study One

Æ

Personal Factors

Æ
Study Two

Æ

Study Three Æ

Bad News Reporting Decision Steps
Assessment –
Status ought
to be reported

Situational Factors

Assessment –
Personal
responsibility
to report

Willingness
to report

Organizational Factors

Figure 1.1 Overall Research Model
This dissertation follows the multi-paper model, and includes three independent,
empirical studies under one overarching theme, which is an individual’s bad news reporting
behavior in the troubled IT project context. A brief introduction to the three studies follows.
1.3.1

Study One
Study One investigates the effects of four exogenous, personal and situational factors on

an individual’s bad news reporting behavior. It is the first study to test personal factors in the IT
project bad news reporting context. The research model (see Figure 1.2 below) mainly builds
upon theories of whistle-blowing, risk, and personal communications, and includes personal
morality and willingness to communicate as personal factors, and type and scope of impact as
situational factors. The three steps in the basic whistle-blowing model are tested as endogenous
variables. Seven hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H5, H6a, H6b, and H6c) were supported, but two
hypotheses (H4 and H7) were not supported.
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Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

H3

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
+
+
H6a

+

Type of
impact

+

H6c

H7

Personal
morality

+

Willingness to
communicate

H5

+

+

+
+

H6b

Perceived
impact of IT
failure

H4

Willingness
to report

H2

Scope of
impact

Figure 1.2 Research Model – Study One
1.3.2

Study Two
Study Two mainly focuses on two situational factors and examines how they influence

the bad news reporting behavior. The research model (see Figure 1.3 below) builds upon theories
of whistle-blowing, risk, and attribution. It includes fault responsibility and time urgency as
exogenous, situational factors, and their effects on the three steps of the basic whistle-blowing
model are tested. All six hypotheses in the research model were supported.
Perceived
fault
responsibility

H3
+

+
Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
+
+
H5

+

H2
+

H6

Perceived
time urgency

Figure 1.3 Research Model – Study Two
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H4

Willingness
to report

1.3.3

Study Three
Study Three focuses on organizational factors. It investigates how organizational forces

affect a climate of silence in an organization and how the climate interacts with the three
reporting decision steps within the basic whistle-blowing model. The research model (see Figure
1.4 below) mainly builds upon theories of organizational silence, whistle-blowing, and social
identification, and includes organizational structures and policies, managerial practices, and
degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers as three exogenous
factors at the organizational level. All eight hypotheses in the research model were supported.

Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
+

H2
+

-

Willingness
to report

-

H3

H4

H5

-

Climate of
Silence

H6
+
Organizational
Structures and
Policies

+

H7

Managerial
Practices

+

H8
Degree of
Demographic
Dissimilarity

Figure 1.4 Research Model – Study Three

1.4

Methodology
Laboratory experimentation based on hypothetical scenarios was conducted to test the

causal relationships between constructs in the three research models. As Jenkins (1985, p. 108)
has noted, in lab experiments “the researcher manipulates the independent variables, controls the
intervening variables, and measures the effect of the independent variables on the dependent
variables.” Each of the three studies manipulated independent variables of interest at different
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levels and examined their effects on the dependent variables, which are the three decision steps
in the basic whistle-blowing model. In addition, because one main objective of each study was to
evaluate a project member’s bad news reporting decision across a potentially wide range of IT
project situations in the real world, the hypothetical scenario approach represented a good
methodological option (Straub and Karahanna 1998).
All three studies in the dissertation involved a factorial design, i.e., the signal-enhancing
experimental design, which directly manipulates the features of the treatment planned in the
research (Trochim 2001). In this dissertation research, Study One and Study Two involved 2 x 2
factorial designs with four hypothetical scenarios, and Study Three involved a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial
design with eight scenarios. Pre-tests and pilot tests for all three studies were conducted to
evaluate the research instrumentation, to validate the measures statistically, and to check the
clarity of the research procedure. Both paper- and web-based surveys were used for the studies in
this dissertation.
Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis was used as the primary analysis tool, which is an
advanced statistical method that allows optimal empirical assessment of a structural model
together with its measurement model (Wold 1982). A measurement model links each construct
with a set of indicators measuring that construct while a structural model represents a network of
causal relationships among constructs. PLS first estimates loadings of indicators on constructs
and then estimates causal relationships among constructs iteratively (Fornell 1982). Thus, PLS is
superior to such traditional methods as factor analysis, regression, and path analysis because it
assesses both measurement and structural models. PLS was selected for this dissertation research
because it is appropriate for testing theories in the early stages of development (Fornell 1982)
and can deal with formative indicators (Chin 1998; Fornell and Bookstein 1982). Each of the
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three studies in the dissertation is an early attempt to develop a theoretical model on bad news
reporting with exogenous factors at different levels, and Study Two and Study Three include
formative constructs in their research models.

1.5

Research History
The following table shows the list of various research activities that have been conducted

to complete this dissertation research (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Research History
Study Two

Study One

Study Three

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Personal / Situational

Situational

Organizational

Ideation

Dec 2005

Jan 2004

Dec 2005

Theoretical and
Practical Check

Jan 2006

Feb 2004

Aug 2006

Research Model
Development

Feb 2006

Feb 2004

Nov 2006 – Jan 2007

Scenario Development

Feb 2006–April 2006

Mar 2004 – Sept 2004

Nov 2006 – Feb 2007

Pilot Tests

Mar 2006–April 2006

Mar 2004 – Sept 2004

Dec 2006 – Mar 2007

Data Collection

April 2006–May 2006

Sept 2004 – Dec 2004

April 2007 – May 2007

Data Analysis

June 2006

Feb 2005

May 2007

Write-up

Dec 2006

July 2005

June 2007

Conf.

Aug 2007 – Annual
Meeting of the Academy
of Management

Aug 2006 – Annual
Meeting of the Academy
of Management

Aug 2007 – Americas’
Conference on
Information Systems

Jrnl.

IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management
(Under Review)

Journal of the Association
for Information Systems
(Under Review)

Decision Sciences Journal
(Under Review)

Chapter
Factors of Interest

Presentations
/Publications

1.6

Conclusion
Although an individual’s bad news reporting has been studied with different labels and

from different perspectives in multiple academic disciplines, there has been no attempt to put
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them together and provide a systematic view on the bad news reporting behavior. This
dissertation advances an overall model of an individual’s bad news reporting in the troubled IT
project context by reviewing and synthesizing three bodies of literature (MUM effect, whistleblowing, and organizational silence), which may contribute to a better understanding of the bad
news reporting phenomenon in an organization.
In addition to presenting an overall model of bad news reporting, this dissertation
includes three independent empirical studies of the phenomenon, investigating the relationships
between various personal, situational, and organizational factors and bad news reporting.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into four chapters. The next three chapters
describe three independent studies (i.e., Study One, Study Two, and Study Three respectively)
including their own theoretically grounded research models, data analyses and results, and
implications. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a brief discussion of the overall
contributions and implications.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of IT Failure Impact and Personal Morality on IT
Project Reporting Behavior1
Abstract
An individual’s reluctance to report the actual status of a troubled project has recently
received research attention as an important contributor to project failure. While there are a
variety of factors influencing the reluctance to report, prior IS research has focused only on
situational factors such as risk, information asymmetry, and time pressure involved in the
situation given. In this paper, we examine the effects of both situational and personal factors on
an individual’s reporting behavior within the rubric of the basic whistle-blowing model adapted
from Dozier and Miceli (1985). Specifically, we identify perceived impact of IT failure as a
situational factor and personal morality and willingness to communicate as personal factors, and
investigate their effects on the assessments and decisions that individuals make about reporting
the IT project’s status. Based on the results of a controlled laboratory experiment, we found that
perceived impact of IT failure directly affects an individual’s assessment of whether a troubled
project’s status ought to be reported, exerting an indirect influence on willingness to report bad
news, and that personal morality directly affects all three steps in the basic whistle-blowing
model, as hypothesized. Willingness to communicate, however, was found not to affect an
individual’s willingness to report bad news. The implications of these findings and directions for
future research are discussed.

Keywords: IT project management, whistle-blowing, bad news reporting, MUM effect,
willingness to communicate, morality, type of impact, scope of impact, impact of IT failure

1

Park, C., Keil, M., and Kim, J. “The Effect of IT Failure Impact and Personal Morality on IT Project Reporting
Behavior,” Working paper, Department of Computer Information Systems, Georgia State University, 2007.
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2.1

Introduction
A recent survey shows that IT project failure is still a widespread problem (Zarrella et al.

2005). A project member’s reluctance to report the true status of the project has been recognized
as a factor that may contribute to IT project failure (Tan et al. 2003). If a project member
withholds bad news about the project’s status from senior management, the troubled project can
escalate and become a runaway project. On the other hand, if the true status of a troubled project
is reported to senior management, there is a chance that some corrective actions can be taken to
turn around the project, or abandon it if necessary. Prior research suggests, however, that, while
evidence of impending failure may be apparent to project members in the lower ranks, this
negative information sometimes fails to be communicated up the hierarchy (Keil and Robey
1999). The human reluctance to transmit unpleasant messages has been termed the “MUM
effect” (Rosen and Tesser 1970).
The MUM effect has been shown to generalize across a wide variety of settings,
individuals, and messages (Tesser and Rosen 1975). While prior research on the MUM effect has
investigated some situational factors such as self-concern, concern for the recipient, and
compliance with norms, there has been comparatively little research on personal factors (e.g.,
morality or willingness to communicate) that may influence the MUM effect.
In this paper, we examine how both personal and situational factors affect an individual’s
bad news reporting behavior in troubled IT projects. Although the area of reporting behavior in
the IS context has not been widely investigated, it has recently begun to receive more research
attention. IS scholars have theoretically identified (Smith and Keil 2003) and empirically tested
potential factors influencing the reporting behavior in a troubled IT project. Smith and Keil
(2003) have identified four situational factors and many moderating factors based on a thorough
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literature review. Empirical research in this area is limited, however, and has focused almost
exclusively on a small set of situational factors that affect the reporting behavior in the IS context.
In order to provide more insight into the relationships between influential factors and bad news
reporting behavior, this research identifies and evaluates both situational and personal factors.
As the role of IT becomes more critical in such industries as healthcare and finance, the
potential impact of IT failures has become much more serious. For example, malfunction of IT
equipment during LASIK eye surgery could cause irreversible blindness (FDA 2006) and a
failed banking system could cause significant financial loss for clients (Nakao 2002). Smith and
Keil (2003) suggest three salient factors in assessing the impact of an IT project failure: type of
impact, scope of impact, and nature of the relationship between the decision-maker and those
who will potentially be affected by the failure. In order to investigate how an individual assesses
the magnitude of impact, we manipulated both type and scope of impact in a controlled
laboratory experiment by developing four scenarios with different types (bodily harm and
financial loss) and scopes (many and few) of impact.
Ethical issues are not new, but they become increasingly important in today’s business
environment. This is because an employee’s sense of morality in business settings (i.e., business
ethics) can influence business decision-making and can ultimately affect a company’s business
success or failure (Kidder 2002). Personal morality has been known to be associated with
assessments and decisions that individuals make about reporting a project’s status in certain
situations (Miceli and Near 1992). In this research, we adopted personal morality measures from
the Big Five (Goldberg 1999), and tested the relationship between personal morality and
reporting behavior.
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Willingness to communicate as a personal factor is known to be consistent over a wide
variety of situations (Borgatta and Bales 1953; Chapple and Arensberg 1940; Goldman-Eisler
1951), but the construct has not been investigated within the context of bad news reporting. Prior
research suggests that willingness to communicate can be used as a valid predictor of actual
communication behavior such as speaking up in the classroom (Chan 1988; Chan and
McCroskey 1987). In this research, we adopted twelve items to measure willingness to
communicate from McCroskey and Richmond (1987), and tested the effect of willingness to
communicate on willingness to report bad news.
This study represents the first time that these three factors have been empirically
investigated using a theoretically grounded model. The remainder of the paper is organized into
five sections. First, we briefly review the relevant literature, focusing on the reporting decision
and the concepts of both situational and personal factors. Next, we introduce our research model
and hypotheses. Then, we briefly describe our research methodology. After we present the
results of the experiment, we conclude the paper with a brief discussion of the implications.

2.2

Background
Figure 2.1 shows the central decision-making model from the whistle-blowing literature,

which provides the basic theoretical framework for this study (Miceli and Near 1992). Dozier
and Miceli (1985) argued that once an individual is aware of a problem (i.e., recognition), he or
she assesses whether the status ought to be reported (i.e., assessment), then considers whether he
or she is responsible for reporting (i.e., responsibility), which in turn influences his or her
willingness to report (i.e., choice of action). IS researchers have adopted this model as a general
outline of individual decision-making regarding bad news reporting and have found support for
the model in a variety of experimental contexts (Smith and Keil 2003; Smith et al. 2001). Thus,
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we also adopt the central decision-making model as a building block for developing an expanded
model with both situational and personal factors.

Assessment:
Status ought to be
reported

+

Assessment:
Personal responsibility
to report

+

Willingness
to report

Figure 2.1 Basic Whistle-Blowing Model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985)

2.2.1

Situational Factors
When an individual makes a decision of reporting the IT project status, he or she may

first consider several factors associated with the IT project situation itself. Smith and Keil (2003)
have theoretically identified four important situational factors that can affect the perceptions of
the IT project situation: risk, time pressure, level of behavioral immorality, and information
asymmetry. While these four situational factors have been empirically tested and confirmed in
the IS literature (Keil et al. 2004; Park et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2001), many other situational
factors may exist.
From the literature review, we have found one interesting situational factor (perceived
impact of IT failure) and its antecedents (type and scope of impact). Based on risk theory, Smith
and Keil (2003) argue that as the magnitude of the impact from IT project failure becomes larger,
the individual should feel more strongly that reporting is required. They also suggest that three
factors will be salient in assessing the impact: the type of impact, the scope of impact, and the
nature of the relationship between the decision-maker and those who will be affected by the
impact. There is only one previous study in which perceived impact has been examined in the IT
project context. Smith et al. (Smith et al. 2001) conceptualized perceived impact as indirectly
affecting the assessment of whether something ought to be reported and consequently did not test
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the direct effect of perceived impact on this assessment. Moreover, they did not examine the
antecedents of perceived impact (e.g., type or scope of impact).
2.2.2

Personal Factors
Prior research clearly indicates that personality and communication are inherently related

to each other. In other words, personality traits seem to be conceptually related to various types
of communication including whistle-blowing. In fact, there is evidence that personal
characteristics are associated with whistle-blowing even though there has been little empirical
work in this area. Miceli and Near (1992) identified personal variables that are expected to affect
the decision to blow the whistle (i.e., potential predictors of whistle-blowing). These include
dispositional variables, values, beliefs, demographic variables, and so forth.
Smith et al. (2001) have found some empirical evidence that personal factors such as risk
propensity can affect the assessments and decisions that individuals make about reporting a
project’s status. Based on theoretical grounds, they suggested morality as a potential personal
factor. In addition, prior research has speculated about the relationship between morality and
whistle-blowing (Dozier and Miceli 1985), implying that an individual having higher moral
standards could have a higher propensity to judge him/herself responsible for action. Willingness
to communicate has also been suggested as a personal factor that affects communication
behavior. For example, MacIntyre, Babin, and Clement (1999) found from their laboratory
experiment that an individual’s willingness to communicate can predict his/her decision to
initiate communication. While both morality and willingness to communicate have been
discussed as potential personal factors influencing reporting behavior, they have not been
hypothesized nor empirically tested before.
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In this paper, we use the basic whistle-blowing model as a foundation upon which to
build a richer model that incorporates both situational (e.g., perceived impact of IT failure) and
personal factors (e.g. morality and willingness to communicate). In the next section, we describe
our research model and hypotheses, which are followed by a discussion of our methodology and
results.

2.3

Research Model
Prior research has identified numerous factors as having the potential to affect the

reporting behavior in a troubled software project (Smith and Keil 2003). Since it would appear
impossible for any one study to empirically test all of the factors, the approach that has been
taken to date involves testing a small number of factors at a time and seeing how they are related
to the three constructs in the whistle-blowing model. In this study, we follow this approach,
testing two situational factors and two personal factors. We have selected type and scope of
impact as situational factors that we believe to be important, but which have yet to be empirically
tested in the context of the basic whistle-blowing model. While prior research on reporting
behavior focuses on and empirically tests situational factors such as project risk (Smith et al.
2001), time pressure (Park et al. 2006), and information asymmetry (Keil et al. 2004), personal
factors have not received research attention. Our research model includes two personal factors
(morality and willingness to communicate), as well as two situational factors. We explicitly state
nine hypotheses corresponding to the nine paths in the research model, as depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

H3

H1
+
+
H6a

+

Perceived
impact of IT
failure

H4

+

Type of
impact

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

+

Willingness
to report

+
H6b

+

Personal
morality

+

H2

H6c

H7

+

Willingness to
communicate

H5

Scope of
impact

Figure 2.2 Research Model

2.3.1

Central Decision-Making Model
The top row of Figure 2.2 represents the central decision-making model grounded in the

whistle-blowing literature. We adopt two hypotheses in the whistle-blowing model that were
shown to hold in recent research (Keil et al. 2004), and retest them in the research model as a
replication.
The whistle-blowing literature posits that the individual will make two distinct
assessments of whether the bad news ought to be reported and the personal responsibility to
report the bad news (Dozier and Miceli 1985), but they are inherently related. Other things being
equal, an individual’s stronger assessment that status information ought to be reported will be
reflected in a stronger feeling of personal responsibility for reporting. Thus, we state the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. A stronger assessment that information ought to be communicated will be
reflected in a higher assessed level of personal responsibility for reporting.
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Following the line of argument from the whistle-blowing literature (Miceli and Near
1992), personal responsibility should have a direct effect on willingness to report bad news. In
addition, this causal relationship between personal responsibility and willingness to report has
been empirically tested and confirmed in the IS literature (Keil et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2001)
Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of assessed personal responsibility will be associated with
greater willingness to report bad news.
We now turn to the situational and personal factors that influence the central model.
2.3.2

Influencing Factors
It has been noted that including other factors could help to further explain the variance in

reporting behavior (Tan et al. 2003). Thus it is necessary that researchers identify and test other
factors that may affect an individual’s reporting behavior. In this research, we focus on three
such factors that have been proposed in the literature, but have not been empirically evaluated
together to determine their respective influence on bad new reporting: perceived impact of IT
failure, personal morality, and willingness to communicate.
2.3.2.1 Perceived Impact of IT Failure
Smith and Keil (2003) theoretically argue from the risk literature that, when the
magnitude of the expected impact (or loss) from failure grows larger, the observer should feel
more strongly that the situation needs to be reported. The literature suggests that risk is the
product of the magnitude of potential loss and the probability of loss (Barki et al. 1993; Billings
et al. 1980; Boehm 1991). However, empirical findings from the risk literature indicate that
people evaluate probability and magnitude of risk separately (March and Shapira 1987).
Researchers have found that managers are affected by the magnitude of potential loss rather than
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the probability of bad outcomes (Kahneman et al. 1982; Shapira 1986). Therefore this research
focuses on perceived impact (i.e., magnitude) rather than probability. We seek to examine the
direct effect of the perceived impact from IT failure on an individual’s assessment of whether the
project status ought to be reported.
When an individual perceives something can cause a potential loss, it may lead to
individual’s assessment that the risk inherent in the situation is high (Smith et al. 2001).
Perceiving the heightened risk, individuals would assess that the given situation ought to be
reported. If the perceived impact of risk is minimal, individuals would be less likely to assess
that the situation is worth being reported. However if the consequences of non-reporting involve
serious magnitude of damage, individuals would perceive that the situation ought to be reported.
Thus,
Hypothesis 3. The greater the perceived impact of IT failure, the more likely people
assess that the situation should be reported.
Smith and Keil (2003) suggest that people may consider three factors in assessing the
impact: the type of impact, the scope of impact, and the nature of the relationship between the
decision-maker and those who will be affected by the impact. In this study, type and scope of
impact are hypothesized as two salient factors affecting an individual’s perception of the
magnitude of the impact.
Regarding the type of impact, prior research identified two types of impact: financial loss
and bodily harm. Barki et al. (1993) introduced several financial types of loss (e.g. financial
health, profitability) when they proposed a measure of software development risk. When
organizations engage in risk management of software development project, consideration of
financial loss is commonplace. Bodily harm represents a different type of loss (Braithwaite 1982;
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Matthews 1987; Miceli and Near 1992). In the software development context, medical devices
operated by sophisticated software can inflict physical harm to patients if the software
malfunctions due to critical bugs.
Thus, in this research, we situate our study within the IT project context and use a role
playing experiment (described in more detail later) to examine these two different types of
impact that could, in theory, result from software bugs. Research in the legal area suggests that
people might be more likely to report bad news when it is related to bodily harm rather than
financial loss (Braithwaite 1982). However, this argument has not been empirically examined in
the software development context. Thus,
Hypothesis 4. Bodily harm will have a greater effect than financial loss on perception of
impact.
In the context of our study, the scope of impact is related to the range of impact software
bugs might inflict. For example, software bugs can negatively affect an individual, a group of
people, an organization, or a society depending on the scope of loss. The larger the scope of
impact is, the more likely people tend to perceive that the related impact is significant (Smith and
Keil 2003). Thus,
Hypothesis 5. The scope of impact will positively affect the perceived impact of IT failure.
2.3.2.2 Morality
Whistle-blowing researchers have speculated about the relationships between morality
and whistle-blowing (Graham 1983; Graham 1986; Miceli and Near 1992). Dozier and Miceli
(1985) suggest that highly moral individuals are more likely to blow the whistle, especially when
the organizational climate is supportive of whistle-blowing. In addition, the prosocial behavior
literature shows that an individual behaves more altruistically when he or she has higher levels of
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moral judgment (Rushton 1980). This implies that individuals with higher levels of moral
judgment will be more likely to report a potential problem if they sense that it could do harm to
others without any prevention.
Miceli and Near (1992, p. 105) argue that higher levels of morality “could heighten the
awareness and assessment of wrongdoing; it could increase the observer’s propensity to judge
himself or herself responsible for action; and it could affect the way observers generate and
evaluate action alternatives.” They also suggest that an individual with higher levels of morality
may highly value the termination of wrongdoing. Taken the above discussions together, it is
reasonable to assume that morality may affect an individual’s reporting decision directly and
indirectly through his or her assessment of the project’s status and perception of personal
responsibility for action. Thus, we state the following three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 6a. Individuals with higher levels of morality are more likely to assess that
the bad news concerning a project and its status ought to be reported.
Hypothesis 6b. Individuals with higher levels of morality are more likely to assess a
personal responsibility to report a project’s status.
Hypothesis 6c. Individuals with higher levels of morality will be more willing to report
bad news.
2.3.2.3 Willingness to Communicate
While an individual may exhibit consistent communication behavior over a wide variety
of situations (Borgatta and Bales 1953; Chapple and Arensberg 1940; Goldman-Eisler 1951), the
communication behaviors of different individuals can vary under identical, situational constraints.
McCroskey and Baer (1985) argue that this variability in communication behavior across
individuals is rooted in a personality variable, which they call ‘willingness to communicate.’
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McCroskey and Richmond (1987) developed self-report instruments to measure the construct of
willingness to communicate in four communication contexts such as small group interaction,
public speaking, talking in meetings, and talking in dyads, and with three types of receivers:
acquaintances, friends, and strangers.
While prior research has mainly focused on the antecedents of willingness to
communicate such as introversion, self-esteem, cultural divergence, and communication
apprehension, effects of willingness to communicate on interpersonal communication have
received little research attention. A few studies have investigated the consequences of
willingness to communicate, showing that the construct of willingness to communicate can be
used as a valid predictor of actual communication behavior (Chan 1988; Chan and McCroskey
1987). In addition, MacIntyre and his colleague (1999) conducted research on the antecedents
and consequences of willingness to communicate, and found that willingness to communicate
predicts the decision to initiate communication. This suggests that willingness to communicate is
an individual-difference variable that can affect an individual’s actual communication behavior
including reporting. It is reasonable to assume that individuals in a troubled IT project who have
a greater willingness to communicate will be more likely to initiate reporting the project’s status.
Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7. Individuals with greater willingness to communicate will be more willing
to report bad news.
In summary, while prior research has suggested that perceived impact of IT failure as a
situational factor, and morality and willingness to communicate as personal factors may affect
reporting behavior in the troubled IT project context, the full nature of the relationships between
the three variables and the basic whistle-blowing model has not been empirically studied.
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Notably, while several situational factors have been investigated in previous studies of bad news
reporting on IT projects (Keil et al. 2004; Park et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2001), to our knowledge,
no personal factors have been investigated within the rubric of the whistle-blowing model. In this
study, we empirically examine the effects of perceived impact, morality, and willingness to
communicate on bad news reporting behavior by investigating how these variables exert their
influence in the central decision model from whistle-blowing theory depicted in Figure 2.2.

2.4

Research Methodology
A laboratory experiment based on hypothetical scenarios was conducted to test the causal

relationships between constructs in the research model. Since one of the objectives of this study
was to evaluate an individual’s decision regarding whether or not to report bad news across a
wide range of IT project situations, the hypothetical scenario approach was a good
methodological option (Straub and Karahanna 1998). The experiment involved a two-factor,
four-cell design with two exogenous variables (type and scope of impact) that were manipulated
independently at two levels. We developed four treatment scenarios as well as several items for
assessing one construct for which we were unable to identify reliable and valid measures. Pilot
tests were conducted to refine the treatment scenarios and validate the measures. College
students at a large university in the southeastern U.S. served as subjects in this process.
2.4.1

Scenario
Each subject was asked to read a short scenario about a troubled IT project called CAPS

and to assume the role of a project team member (see Appendix 2A). Subjects were informed
that the CAPS project involved writing a wealth management software program in one scenario
and a radiation treatment software program in the other, and that a serious bug had been
identified in the software. The subject’s company has promised that the CAPS project will be
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installed and fully operational within a week. The type of impact (bodily harm, financial loss)
and the scope of impact (one in a billion, ninety-nine percent) were manipulated independently
to yield four treatment conditions.
Bodily harm as a type of impact was manipulated as a software bug that produced lethal
doses of radiation for patients that were treated. Financial loss as a type of impact was
manipulated as a software bug that placed all of a client’s wealth in penny stocks and led to
bankruptcy. In both treatment conditions, the subject was informed that he or she would face no
personal liability.
To manipulate the scope of impact, we varied the numbers of people to be affected. For
the large scope manipulation, the subject was informed that ninety-nine percent of all clients that
used the system would almost certainly be financially bankrupt in the financial loss case, and
ninety-nine percent of all patients that are treated will almost certainly die in the bodily harm
case. For the small scope manipulation, the subject was informed that only one in a billion clients
would almost certainly be financially bankrupt in the financial loss case, and only one in a billion
patients would almost certainly die in the bodily harm case.
2.4.2

Procedure
A role-playing experiment was conducted in which subjects were told that this was an

experimental study about business decision-making in an IT project situation and that their
answers would remain anonymous. They were reminded that their participation was voluntary
and those who did not wish to participate in the experiment could leave, but most subjects chose
to participate. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions (obtained
by varying the type and the scope of impact). The experimental procedure consisted of two parts.
In the first part, subjects received a copy of the scenario corresponding to their respective
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treatment condition and were asked to read the scenario. In the second part, subjects were asked
to complete a questionnaire that measured their willingness to report bad news and also answer
several items regarding their perceptions of impact; their assessments of whether the information
concerning the project ought to be reported; their assessments of whether they had a personal
responsibility to report the information; their self-reporting of their morality; their self-reporting
of their willingness to communicate; and a series of manipulation checks. They were then asked
to provide some demographic information.
Several procedural remedies were taken to address common method bias. As evaluation
apprehension may cause common method biases, we took two steps to minimize it. First, we
made the respondents' answers anonymous. Second, we assured respondents that there were no
right or wrong answers. These steps made them less likely to edit their responses to be socially
desirable and consistent with their perception of how the researcher wanted them to respond. In
addition, we carefully constructed the items. Vague and ambiguous terms were avoided. Instead,
we used concise and simple terms and syntax to make questions focused and easy to understand.
2.4.3

Subjects
A total of 159 undergraduate students enrolled in one or more introductory business

requirement courses at a large urban university in the southeastern United States in 2006 were
recruited for the study. Four subjects were dropped from the subject pool because they failed the
manipulation check or did not complete the questionnaire. The mean age of the remaining 155
subjects was 22.7 years and the mean work experience was 2.54 years. Forty-five percent of the
subjects were male, and 55 percent were female.
While the use of student subjects can limit the generalizability of the results, student
subjects are commonly used in experiments that probe human decision-making (Harrison and
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Harrell 1993; Sitkin and Weingart 1995). Moreover, there is some support in the literature for
using student subjects as surrogates for managers (DeSanctis 1989; Gordon et al. 1987; Remus
1986), especially when the decision-making task does not require highly specialized domain
knowledge. In this study, the subjects were asked to adopt the role of a team member in an IT
project and to make a decision in a certain situation. Business decision-making was discussed in
the courses that the subjects were taking at the time of data collection, and they had an average
of 2.54 years work experience. Thus, we believe that the subjects were able to appreciate the
context of the scenario and it is reasonable to assume that they could project themselves into the
role of a project team member for the purposes of the experiment.
2.4.4

Measures
Multi-item measures for perceived impact of IT failure were developed for this study. We

also adopted existing multi-item measures for willingness to report bad news (Park et al. 2006),
assessment of whether the project status ought to be reported, personal responsibility to report
(Smith et al. 2001), morality (Goldberg 1999), and willingness to communicate (McCroskey and
Richmond 1987). Single-item dichotomous measures were created as manipulation checks for
type and scope of impact. All measurement scales were validated through pilot testing of the
experimental materials aimed at fine-tuning the scenario, the manipulations, and the
instrumentation.
The willingness to report bad news was measured using three items that were anchored
on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (7). The
willingness to communicate was measured using twelve items that were anchored on a sevenpoint Likert scale ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (7). Morality was measured
using twelve items that were anchored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “very
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inaccurate” (1) to “very accurate” (7). All of the other multi-item measures were assessed on a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Appendix
2B shows the constructs and measures used in the study along with descriptive statistics for each.

2.5

Results

2.5.1

Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were performed to verify that the manipulations of type and scope

of impact were effective. Two manipulation check questions were developed to directly ask the
subjects whether they understood the situation correctly as described in the scenario. In the
financial loss scenario, we checked the manipulation for type of impact by asking ‘Left
uncorrected, the bug that was identified could have a financial impact on clients. [ □ True / □
False ],’ and for scope of impact by asking ‘If the bug is not resolved, it will affect [ □ only one
in a billion clients / □ ninety-nine percent of all clients ] that use the system.’ In the bodily harm
scenario, we checked the manipulation for type of impact by asking ‘Left uncorrected, the bug
that was identified could have a medical impact on patients. [ □ True / □ False ],’ and for scope
of impact by asking ‘If the bug is not resolved, it will affect [ □ only one in a billion patients / □
ninety-nine percent of all patients ] that are treated with the radiation machine.’ Three subjects
who failed their manipulation checks were removed from the data pool.
Figure 2.3 provides summary statistics for the perceived impact (IMP) and willingness to
report (WTR) by each treatment condition manipulated with type and scope of impact.
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Scope of Impact

N = 37
High

N = 38
Mean (S.D.)
6.28 (0.98)
6.26 (0.77)

IMP
WTR
N = 44

Low

Mean (S.D.)
6.10 (0.88)
5.89 (1.18)

N = 36
Mean (S.D.)
3.96 (1.59)
5.14 (1.62)

IMP
WTR

IMP
WTR

Bodily Harm

IMP
WTR

Mean (S.D.)
3.95 (1.52)
4.71 (1.84)

Financial Loss

Type of Impact
Figure 2.3 Perceived Impact and Willingness to Report by Treatment Condition
2.5.2

Partial Least Squares Analysis
Partial Least Squares 2 (PLS) analysis was used for measurement validation and for

evaluating the hypothesized paths in the research model. PLS analysis was considered
appropriate for this study because it places minimal demands on sample size, measurement
scales, and distributional assumptions (Chin 1998; Fornell and Bookstein 1982) and because it
has been used in previous studies involving the reporting behavior in troubled software projects
(Keil et al. 2004; Park et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2001). The measurement model must be
established by examining the psychometric properties of the measures before testing the
structural model. A measurement model links each construct with a set of indicators measuring
that construct while a structural model represents a network of causal relationships linking
multiple constructs.
2.5.3

Measurement Model
Since our research model included both reflective and formative constructs, this

influenced the manner in which construct validity was assessed, particularly with respect to
2

PLS Graph version 3.0
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convergent validity. As an example of this, traditional approaches for assessing construct
reliability cannot be meaningfully applied to formative constructs as there is no assumption that
formative indicators will covary.
2.5.3.1 Formative Constructs
For the two formative constructs, i.e., morality and willingness to communicate, we
examined multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is not desirable in formative constructs because it
can lead to inflated standard errors and thus can have an adverse effect on measurement
reliability. As a general rule, a variance inflation factor (VIF) value above 10 indicates serious
multicollinearity (Duman et al. 2006). Recent guidelines suggest that VIF values for formative
measures greater than 3.3 may cause multicollinearity problems (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw
2006; Petter et al. 2007). The VIF values in Table 2.1 are all much less than 10, but a few of the
WTC items exceed the 3.3 threshold. Based on this analysis, there is minimal risk of
multicollinearity and all WTC items were retained to preserve content validity.
Table 2.1 Variance Inflation Factor for Formative Constructs
Construct

Items

Variance
Inflation Factor
(VIF)

Construct

Items

Variance
Inflation Factor
(VIF)

Willingness to
Communicate

WTC1
WTC2
WTC3
WTC4
WTC5
WTC6
WTC7
WTC8
WTC9
WTC10
WTC11
WTC12

2.006
3.169
3.397
2.541
3.626
5.267
2.742
3.539
5.598
2.279
2.733
3.076

Morality

MOR1
MOR2
MOR3
MOR4
MOR5
MOR6
MOR7
MOR8
MOR9
MOR10
MOR11
MOR12

1.512
1.646
1.577
2.341
1.661
1.803
1.498
1.394
1.523
1.783
1.730
1.806
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2.5.3.2 Convergent Validity
To evaluate convergent validity of reflective constructs in the model, we first examined
standardized loadings. The standardized loadings should be greater than 0.707 to meet the
condition that the shared variance between each item and its associated construct exceed the
error variance. Loadings of 0.5 or 0.6 may still be acceptable if other indicators within the same
block of measures have high loadings (Chin 1998). As seen in Table 2.2, all the loadings were
0.723 or higher. Therefore, we retained all the indicators for subsequent analysis.
In order to evaluate the internal consistency for each block of measures, we examined
Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted. While the threshold
values for Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability are not absolute, it is suggested that 0.70
indicates extensive evidence of reliability and 0.80 or higher provides exemplary evidence
(Bearden et al. 1993; Yi and Davis 2003). As shown in Table 2.2, all of the constructs in the
measurement model exhibited Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77 or higher, and composite reliability of
0.87 or higher. As another measure of construct validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest
average variance extracted (AVE). AVE measures the amount of variance that a latent construct
captures from its indicators relative to the amount of variance from measurement error, and
therefore is only applicable to reflective constructs (Chin 1998, p. 321). The acceptable level for
AVE is 0.5 or higher, meaning that 50 percent or more variance of the indicators is accounted for
(Chin 1998). As seen in Table 2.2, all the AVEs are above the threshold of 0.5. Thus, our
evaluations of Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and AVE indicate that the construct
reliability of all the reflective constructs’ items has been established satisfactorily.
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Table 2.2 Item Loadings and Construct Reliability
Construct

Item

Standardized
Loading

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Composite
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted

Perceived Impact

IMP1

0.912

0.833

0.899

0.749

IMP2

0.903

IMP3

0.775

OTR1

0.900

0.770

0.870

0.693

OTR2

0.723

OTR3

0.865

Assessment Personal
Responsibility to
Report

RSR1

0.911

0.810

0.888

0.728

RSR2

0.743

RSR3

0.896

Willingness to
Report

WTR1

0.929

0.913

0.945

0.851

WTR2

0.936

WTR3

0.903

Assessment Status Ought to Be
Reported

2.5.3.3 Discriminant Validity
We conducted two tests for discriminant validity. First, each indicator’s loading on its
own construct and its cross-loading on all other constructs were calculated (Chin 1998). Table
2.3 shows that the loadings for the intended indicators for each construct are higher than the
cross-loadings for indicators from other constructs. Moreover, each indicator has a higher
loading with its intended construct than a cross-loading with any other construct.
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Table 2.3 Item to Own Construct Correlation versus Correlations with Other Constructs
Construct

Item

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Perceived Impact
(IMP)

IMP1
IMP2
IMP3

0.906
0.902
0.782

0.377
0.418
0.469

0.298
0.323
0.381

0.485
0.470
0.538

0.052
0.065
0.189

0.082
0.123
0.102

2. Assessment - Status
Ought to Be Reported
(OTR)

OTR1
OTR2
OTR3

0.408
0.342
0.460

0.875
0.776
0.839

0.603
0.457
0.578

0.539
0.421
0.652

0.284
0.214
0.219

0.129
0.187
0.117

3. Assessment - Personal
Responsibility to Report
(RSR)

RSR1
RSR2
RSR3

0.397
0.215
0.380

0.719
0.437
0.537

0.874
0.807
0.877

0.642
0.433
0.650

0.305
0.313
0.348

0.076
0.083
0.086

4. Willingness to Report
(WTR)

WTR1
WTR2
WTR3

0.525
0.563
0.500

0.613
0.587
0.586

0.642
0.612
0.602

0.931
0.935
0.902

0.174
0.222
0.281

0.152
0.107
0.074

5. Morality (MOR)

MOR1
MOR2
MOR3
MOR4
MOR5
MOR6
MOR7
MOR8
MOR9
MOR10
MOR11
MOR12

0.100
0.206
0.133
0.241
0.041
0.190
-0.068
-0.035
0.071
0.018
-0.009
0.037

0.163
0.209
0.154
0.352
0.126
0.323
0.103
0.105
0.163
0.130
0.199
0.082

0.278
0.227
0.170
0.343
0.240
0.417
0.116
0.084
0.218
0.177
0.240
0.227

0.220
0.164
0.034
0.293
0.125
0.328
0.069
0.013
0.129
0.120
0.113
0.150

0.556
0.516
0.479
0.702
0.600
0.679
0.489
0.530
0.631
0.649
0.642
0.655

-0.014
0.010
0.095
0.101
0.020
0.040
0.134
0.140
0.069
0.057
0.139
0.050

6. Willingness to
Communicate (WTC)

WTC1
WTC2
WTC3
WTC4
WTC5
WTC6
WTC7
WTC8
WTC9
WTC10
WTC11
WTC12

-0.043
0.149
0.108
0.066
0.160
0.111
0.158
0.065
0.136
0.050
0.078
0.065

0.092
0.128
0.164
0.037
0.089
0.206
0.163
0.109
0.197
0.125
0.157
0.156

0.087
0.025
0.157
-0.081
0.104
0.107
0.126
0.027
0.091
0.085
0.098
0.060

0.043
0.083
0.130
-0.001
0.083
0.126
0.177
0.033
0.125
0.079
0.170
0.075

0.146
0.053
0.139
-0.007
0.139
0.068
0.045
0.116
0.084
0.069
0.123
0.130

0.627
0.788
0.791
0.762
0.742
0.878
0.762
0.807
0.867
0.663
0.698
0.793
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Second, we compared AVE for each reflective construct with the shared variance
between all possible pairs of reflective constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Morality and
willingness to communicate have been excluded in this analysis because AVE is not applicable
for formative constructs (Chin 1998). Table 2.4 shows that AVE for each construct is higher than
the squared correlation between the construct pairs, which indicates that more variance is shared
between the latent construct and its block of indicators than with another construct representing a
different block of indicators. Thus, it also establishes discriminant validity among the reflective
constructs.
Table 2.4 AVEs versus Squares of Correlations between Constructs
Construct

Average Variance Extracted
(AVE)

IMP

IMP

0.749

-

OTR

0.693

0.235

-

RSR

0.728

0.158

0.464

-

WTR

0.851

0.327

0.425

0.470

2.5.4

OTR

RSR

WTR

-

Structural Model
The structural model was assessed by examining path coefficients and their significance

levels. The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated by examining the R2 value
of the final dependent construct. The final dependent construct, willingness to report bad news,
had an R2 value of 0.51, indicating that the research model accounts for 51% of the variance in
the dependent variable. It is also instructive to examine the R2 values for the intermediate
variables in the structural model. The R2 value for “personal responsibility to report”, “status
ought to be reported”, and “perceived impact” were 0.50, 0.35, and 0.44 respectively. It is
apparent that the R2 values are sufficiently high to make interpretation of the path coefficients
meaningful. In particular, 51% of the variance explained in the final dependent variable stands as
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compelling evidence of the research model’s explanatory power, and is comparable to results
obtained in prior studies that have examined other factors that influence bad news reporting. For
example, Smith et al. (2001) reported an R2 of 24% for a model that investigated the effects of
perceived wrongdoing and perceived project risk, Keil et al. (2004) reported an R2 of 38% for a
model that investigated the effects of perceived information asymmetry and perceived
organizational climate, and Park et al. (2006) reported an R2 of 32% for a model that investigated
the effects of time pressure and face saving.
We computed path coefficients in the structural model with the entire sample, and
employed the bootstrapping method (with 500 resamples) to obtain the t-values corresponding to
each path (see Figure 2.4). The acceptable t-values for two-tailed tests are 1.96 and 2.58 at the
significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01. The assessment of whether the status ought to be reported
had a direct positive effect on the assessment of personal responsibility to report, supporting H1
(β = 0.58, p < 0.01). The assessment of personal responsibility to report had a direct positive
effect on the willingness to report bad news, which means that subjects were more willing to
report when they perceived themselves to be personally responsible for reporting the bad news.
Thus, H2 was supported (β = 0.57, p < 0.01). Perceived impact had a direct positive effect on the
assessment of whether the status ought to be reported (β = 0.38, p < 0.01), thus supporting H3.
Type of impact did not have a significant effect on perceived impact (β = 0.03, n.s.), and
therefore H4 was not supported. Scope of impact, however, did have a positive effect on
perceived impact (β = 0.66, p < 0.01), thus supporting H5. Morality had positive effects on the
assessment of whether the status ought to be reported (β = 0.35, p < 0.01), the assessment of
personal responsibility to report (β = 0.23, p < 0.05), and the willingness to report bad news (β =
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0.15, p < 0.05), thus supporting H6a, H6b, and H6c. Willingness to communicate did not
significantly affect willingness to report (β = 0.15, n.s.). Thus, H7 was not supported.

R2 = 0.35

R2 = 0.50

Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

H3

0.58
(t = 6.17)

0.38
(t = 5.12)

H6a

H6b

0.35
(t = 4.14)

Perceived
impact of IT
failure

R2 = 0.44

H4

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1

0.03
(t = 0.44)

Type of
impact

0.23
(t = 2.38)

R2 = 0.51

H2
0.57
(t = 7.33)

H6c

Personal
morality

0.15
(t = 1.98)

Willingness
to report

H7

0.15
(t = 1.21)

Willingness to
communicate

0.66
H5
(t = 15.30)
Scope of
impact

Figure 2.4 Structural Model
2.5.5

Safeguarding Against and Assessing Common Method Bias
In order to examine the existence of common method bias, we conducted two different

tests. One is Harmon's single-factor analysis (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We loaded all items used to
measure both independent and dependent variables into a single exploratory factor analysis. The
analysis produced eight factors with eigenvalues higher than 1. Taken together, these factors
explained 69.4% of the variance of the data, with the first extracted factor accounting for 23.5%
of the variance in the data. Given that more than one factor was extracted from the analysis and
the first factor was accountable for much less than 50% of the variance, common method bias is
unlikely to be a significant issue with the collected data. The other is a latent variable approach
of adding a first-order factor with all of the measures in the theoretical model as indicators
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). A common method factor was therefore added in the research model
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(Liang et al. 2007) and the results demonstrate that the average substantively explained variance
of the indicators is 0.567, whereas the average method-based variance is 0.008. The ratio of
substantive variance to method variance is 71:1. Moreover, most method factor loadings are not
significant. Thus, common method bias is unlikely to be a serious concern in this study.

2.6

Discussion and Implications
This study demonstrates that both personal and situational factors can have significant

effects on an individual’s bad news reporting behavior. Perceived impact as a situational factor
affects an individual’s willingness to report indirectly through the assessment of whether the
status ought to be reported. Two predictors of perceived impact (type of impact and scope of
impact) were operationalized and tested. Type of impact (bodily harm versus financial loss) did
not affect perceived impact, whereas scope of impact did affect perceived impact.
Morality as a personal factor was found to affect an individual’s three decision steps
specified in the basic whistle-blowing model: the assessment of whether the project status ought
to be reported, the assessment of personal responsibility to report the status of the troubled
software project, and the willingness to report the bad news about the project. Our results are
consistent with the theoretical arguments of Miceli and Near (1992) and empirically confirm that
personal factors such as morality can affect an individual’s bad news reporting.
Unlike morality, willingness to communicate as a personal factor did not appear to have
any direct effect on an individual’s willingness to report. This finding is of interest because it
suggests that willingness to report bad news may be influenced to a greater degree by
psychological features of personality (e.g., morality) than behavioral features of personality (e.g.,
willingness to communicate).

40

2.6.1

Limitations of the Study
While laboratory experimentation provides a highly controlled environment for

hypothesis testing, it does pose some methodological limitations. First, our experiment is based
on role-playing scenarios to represent a real world context. While we tried to be as realistic as
possible in creating the scenarios, we also sought to control extraneous sources of variance and
provided only the essential information needed for role-playing and decision-making. Clearly,
there are other organizational and political factors that may also influence an individual’s
willingness to report bad news. Those factors have not been examined in this study and may not
lend themselves to our experiment. Second, the decision choice presented to the subjects in our
experiment represents a necessarily simplified view of the options available to one who is faced
with the decision of whether and how to report a troubled IT project’s status. In this study, we
framed the situation as a choice of whether or not to report the project status to his or her boss.
Clearly, individuals can make other choices in responding to such a situation, such as informing
another team member who may be responsible for the bug or deciding to report through some
other channel. Third, we have measured a subject’s self-reported behavioral intention rather than
actual behavior. There is no guarantee that subjects would actually behave as they have indicated.
Despite these limitations, the strong relationships among the constructs in the research model and
its explanatory power shed significant light on the important factors that can influence the
reporting behavior. Thus, we believe that our study represents a significant contribution to our
understanding of this phenomenon.
2.6.2

Research Contributions
Our study contributes to research in several ways. First, we empirically re-confirmed

strong and significant relationships among willingness to report and its antecedents in the basic
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decision model derived from whistle-blowing theory. In particular, our results show greater
explanatory power (R2 = 0.51) of the final dependent variable (i.e., willingness to report) in the
basic whistle-blowing model than previous studies.
Another significant contribution is the extension of the basic reporting model through the
introduction and testing of two personal factors derived from the psychology and communication
literature – morality and willingness to communicate. Personal factors have not been studied
previously in the context of bad news reporting, and this is the first study including and testing
personal factors. In addition, one of the two personal factors tested (i.e., morality) had significant
direct and indirect effects on the willingness to report bad news about the project, thus
supporting Miceli and Near’s (1992) theoretical arguments. Clearly, incorporating the personal
factors allowed us to construct a richer model of bad news reporting, and will provide a solid
foundation for future research.
Finally, this study confirms the effect of perceived impact of IT failure on an individual’s
reporting behavior that was suggested by Smith and Keil (2003). While Smith et al. (2001) have
tested how an individual’s perception of project failure impact on his/her company’s financial
position affects his or her reporting behavior, an individual’s perception of IT failure impact on
the public has not been previously hypothesized and tested in the context of bad news reporting.
In addition, we statistically tested the relationship between bodily harm and perceived impact
which has not been operationalized before even though literature in management and law
asserted the relationship.
2.6.3

Directions for Future Research
Although our study confirms the effect of morality as a personal factor for the first time,

there may be other personal factors that can also affect an individual’s reporting behavior. For
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example, Smith et al. (2001) have suggested propensity for ethical reasoning and locus of control
as interesting personal factors, but they have not been tested yet. In addition, while this study
focused on personal morality in general, future research can investigate more business-related
morality such as business ethics specific to the IT project context. Theoretically identifying and
empirically testing these personal factors represents a worthwhile goal for future research and
may allow further extension of the basic whistle-blowing model in the context of IT project
management.
Another avenue for future research would be considering organizational factors as an
extension of bad news reporting research. While prior research has mainly identified and tested
situational factors and this study has investigated personal factors, organizational factors have
received little research attention in the context of bad news reporting. One recent study has tested
the organizational culture conducive (or not conducive) to reporting as an organizational factor
and found this to have a significant effect on the assessment of personal responsibility to report
(Keil et al. 2004). However, there has been no empirical work to examine the organizational
culture’s interaction with the first antecedent (i.e., assessment of whether the status ought to be
reported) and the ultimate dependent variable (i.e., willingness to report) in the basic decision
model. Moreover, there has been no investigation of specific organizational features or
managerial practices affecting the organizational culture. We believe that these specific
antecedents to the organizational culture represent promising avenues for future research.
Further, Smith and Keil (2003) proposed that the nature of the relationship between the
bad news reporter and those affected by the impact(s) associated with failure could be an
important predictor of perceived impact. For example, when loved one could get hurt in a certain
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situation, individuals would presumably perceive more impact. Further research is needed to
empirically examine the proposed relationship.
2.6.4

Implications for Practice
This study has several important implications for practice. First, perceived impact does

appear to have a significant effect on willingness to report. Managers may be able to take
advantage of the fact that individuals are more willing to report bad news when perceived impact
of the failure is high. Specifically, managers can encourage their employees to report potential
issues and problems by stressing the huge consequences (both inside and outside the
organization) that can result from the IT project failure. In communicating with employees,
managers should emphasize that in the long run, reporting that is honest and forthcoming is the
best way to minimize or contain the impact associated with failure. It is almost always easier and
less expensive to deal with a problem while it is small and while there is still time for corrective
action to be taken before the magnitude of the impact becomes larger.
The second implication for practice relates to the observed direct and indirect effects of
personal morality on decision-making (i.e., willingness to report). This becomes meaningful in
the organizational context, because it suggests that managers can motivate individuals’
willingness to report by educating employees in business ethics (i.e., moral beliefs and rules
about right and wrong behaviors in business organizations and settings).
Finally, our results suggest that the communication of bad news in project settings is not
a function of an individual’s general willingness to communicate. This would seem to suggest
that garrulous employees will be no more willing to communicate bad news than shy, reticent
employees. Thus, managers would be ill-advised to embark on a strategy of promoting bad news
reporting by seeking to recruit employees on the basis of their willingness to communicate.
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Appendix 2A. Experimental Scenario and Instructions

INSTRUCTIONS: The business case that follows is part of a study that examines business
decision-making. Please take a few minutes to read over the case and to answer the
questionnaire that follows. There are no right or wrong answers.

Radiation Treatment Incorporated
You work for Radiation Treatment Incorporated, a company that specializes in machines
that deliver prescribed doses of radiation to treat cancer patients. At the heart of the machine is a
specialized software program that controls the intensity and targeting of an external radiation
beam for treating cancer tumors.
For the past year, you have been working on an exciting new project, CAPS – which
involves writing a new software program that promises to improve the targeting of the radiation
so that there are fewer side effects to surrounding tissues in the body. Next week the new
software will be installed in thousands of hospitals and treatment centers around the world.
Today, you discovered a serious bug in the software which could result in lethal doses of
radiation for ninety-nine percent of all patients that are treated. If a patient should receive a
lethal dose of radiation from the machine, s/he will almost certainly die. The scope of the
impact would be extremely high (ninety-nine percent of all patients that are treated would be
affected), but you would face no personal liability. The bug you discovered has nothing to do
with your work on the project. Moreover, your company would remain financially sound.
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At this point, you are now wondering whether or not you should report what you found to
your boss. From past experience you know your boss does not like to hear about possible bugs
or anything else that can delay a project. On multiple occasions you have observed situations in
which employees at your company have been fired for reporting such news. If you remain silent,
no one but you will ever know that you discovered a possible bug.

The above scenario represents the treatment used to manipulate bodily harm as type of impact
and high scope of impact. The treatment for low scope of impact is identical except for the third
paragraph, which the following paragraph is substitute for:
Today, you discovered a serious bug in the software which could result in lethal doses of
radiation for only one in a billion patients that are treated. If a patient should receive a lethal
dose of radiation from the machine, s/he will almost certainly die. The scope of the impact
would be extremely low (only one in a billion patients that are treated would be affected), and
you would face no personal liability. The bug you discovered has nothing to do with your work
on the project. Moreover, your company would remain financially sound.
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INSTRUCTIONS: The business case that follows is part of a study that examines business
decision-making. Please take a few minutes to read over the case and to answer the
questionnaire that follows. There are no right or wrong answers.

Wealth Management Incorporated
You work for Wealth Management Incorporated, a company that specializes in systems
that manage all of the assets for individual investors. At the heart of the system is a specialized
software program that controls the risk level of the investment portfolio using sophisticated math
modeling.
For the past year, you have been working on an exciting new project, CAPS – which
involves writing a new web-based software program that is designed to automatically invest all
of a client’s assets so as to maximize returns while minimizing risk. Next week the new software
will be made available to thousands of clients around the world.
Today, you discovered a serious bug in the software which could place all of a client’s
wealth in penny stocks. These penny stocks are very high risk stocks trading at less than
$1/share. Holding these stocks will result in catastrophic financial losses for ninety-nine
percent of all clients that use the system. If a client should experience a catastrophic financial
loss, s/he will almost certainly be financially bankrupt. The scope of the impact would be
extremely high (ninety-nine percent of all clients that use the system would be affected), but you
would face no personal liability. The bug you discovered has nothing to do with your work on
the project. Moreover, your company would remain financially sound.
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At this point, you are now wondering whether or not you should report what you found to
your boss. From past experience you know your boss does not like to hear about possible bugs
or anything else that can delay a project. On multiple occasions you have observed situations in
which employees at your company have been fired for reporting such news. If you remain silent,
no one but you will ever know that you discovered a possible bug.

The above scenario represents the treatment used to manipulate financial loss as type of impact
and high scope of impact. The treatment for low scope of impact is identical except for the third
paragraph, which the following paragraph is substitute for:
Today, you discovered a serious bug in the software which could place all of a client’s
wealth in penny stocks. These penny stocks are very high risk stocks trading at less than
$1/share. Holding these stocks will result in catastrophic financial losses for
only one in a billion clients that use the system. If a client should experience a catastrophic
financial loss, s/he will almost certainly be financially bankrupt. The scope of the impact
would be extremely low (only one in a billion clients that use the system would be affected), and
you would face no personal liability. The bug you discovered has nothing to do with your work
on the project. Moreover, your company would remain financially sound.
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Appendix 2B. Constructs, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics
Willingness to Report Bad News
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely)
WTR1

5.55

1.73 Please indicate your willingness to IMMEDIATELY (i.e., RIGHT
NOW) report the bad news to your boss.

WTR2

5.37

1.62 At this time, how likely are you to go directly to your boss by
yourself to report the bad news concerning the project’s status?

WTR3
5.56
(reversed)

1.62 Please indicate how likely it is that you would avoid telling your boss
the bad news.

Assessment of Responsibility to Report
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
RSR1

5.87

1.32 I believe that I have a personal responsibility to make more
information about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

RSR2
5.71
(reversed)

1.49 I believe that it is not my responsibility to make more information
about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

RSR3

1.45 I believe that it is my personal duty to tell my boss about the project’s
status.

5.52

Assessment of Whether Something Ought to Be Reported
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
OTR1

6.03

1.20 I believe that something should be done to make more information
about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

OTR2
5.80
(reversed)

1.36 I don’t believe that it really matters whether more information about
the status of the CAPS project is made known to my boss.

OTR3

1.28 Even if it is not me, I believe someone should tell my boss about the
status of the CAPS project.

6.12

Perceived Impact
Variable
Mean s.d.

Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)

IMP1

5.10

1.96 I believe the degree of impact to the public that could result from the
bug is very high.

IMP2

4.68

2.08 I believe that there will be wide spread harm to the public if the bug
is not corrected.

IMP3
5.32
(reversed)

1.86 I believe that, even if the bug is not resolved, the risk to the public is
acceptable.
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Morality
Variable

Mean s.d.

Item Wording (1 = very inaccurate; 7 = very accurate)

MOR1

5.92

1.38

I would never cheat on my taxes.

MOR2

6.24

0.82

I respect the privacy of others.

MOR3

6.37

0.77

I like harmony in my life.

MOR4

6.06

0.95

I try to follow the rules.

MOR5

5.96

0.92

I respect authority.

MOR6 (reversed)

5.86

1.21

I don't care about rules.

MOR7 (reversed)

6.29

1.07

I turn my back on others.

MOR8 (reversed)

5.57

1.48

I only talk about my own interests.

MOR9 (reversed)

5.08

1.48

I overestimate my achievements.

MOR10 (reversed)

6.10

1.16

I scheme against others.

MOR11 (reversed)

5.88

1.23

I act at the expense of others.

MOR12 (reversed)

5.59

1.33

I break rules.

Willingness to Communicate
Variable
Mean s.d.

Item Wording (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely)

WTC1

3.75

1.80

Present a talk to a group of strangers.

WTC2

5.09

1.72

Talk with an acquaintance while standing in line.

WTC3

5.39

1.78

Talk in a large meeting of friends.

WTC4

4.07

1.75

Talk in a small group of strangers.

WTC5

5.96

1.55

Talk with a friend while standing in line.

WTC6

5.02

1.81

Talk in a large meeting of acquaintances.

WTC7

3.96

1.85

Talk with a stranger while standing in line.

WTC8

5.38

1.68

Present a talk to a group of friends.

WTC9

5.24

1.60

Talk in a small group of acquaintances.

WTC10

3.39

1.87

Talk in a large meeting of strangers.

WTC11

6.00

1.30

Talk in a small group of friends.

WTC12

4.87

1.71

Present a talk to a group of acquaintances.
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Construct Correlation Table
WTR
RSR

OTR

IMP

WTR

1

RSR

0.671**

1

OTR

0.646**

0.656**

1

IMP

0.573**

0.384**

0.486**

1

MOR

0.244**

0.379**

0.287**

0.115

WTC
0.121
0.096
0.176**
0.119
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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MOR

WTC

1
0.119

1

Chapter 3
Overcoming the MUM Effect in IT Project Reporting:
Impacts of Fault Responsibility and Time Urgency3

Abstract
Troubled projects are a common problem in the information systems field. While there is
a natural reluctance to report the actual status of a troubled project, doing so is sometimes the
only way that the project can be brought to senior management’s attention so that corrective
actions can be taken to successfully turn the project around if possible, or abandon it if necessary.
In this paper we draw upon the basic whistle-blowing model adapted from Dozier and Miceli
(1985) to examine the effect that fault responsibility has on an individual’s assessment of
whether a troubled project’s status ought to be reported and on that individual’s willingness to
report. We also examine the effect that time urgency has on an individual’s assessments of
whether a troubled project’s status ought to be reported and whether that individual has personal
responsibility to report the project’s status. Based on the results of a controlled laboratory
experiment, we confirmed the basic whistle-blowing model and found that both fault
responsibility and time urgency are important factors affecting an individual’s willingness to
report bad news. Fault responsibility exerts both direct and indirect influence on willingness to
report bad news, while time urgency was found only to exert an indirect influence on willingness
to report bad news. The implications of these findings and directions for future research are
discussed.
Keywords: Project management, whistle-blowing, MUM effect, fault responsibility, time
urgency

3

Park, C., Im, G., and Keil, M. “Overcoming the MUM Effect in IT Project Reporting: Impacts of Fault
Responsibility and Time Urgency,” Working paper, Department of Computer Information Systems, Georgia State
University, 2006.
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3.1

Introduction
Project failure is a serious problem in the information systems field. The MUM effect

(O'Neal et al. 1979)—or the reluctance of people to report unpleasant messages—has been
recognized as a factor that may contribute to software project failure (Tan et al. 2003). If bad
news about a project’s status is withheld from senior management, troubled projects can escalate
and become runaway software projects. Conversely, if the status of a troubled project is reported
to senior management, there is a chance that corrective actions can be immediately taken to
successfully turn the project around, or terminate it if necessary, before further resources are
squandered.
Prior research suggests that evidence of impending failure may be apparent to those who
are closely involved in a software project, yet this information sometimes fails to be
communicated up the hierarchy (Keil and Robey 1999) or, if communicated, is substantially
distorted in the process (Snow and Keil 2002). One study reported that even information systems
auditors—who are role prescribed to serve as watchdogs—are often reluctant to report bad news
about project status due to personal and organizational factors (Keil and Robey 2001).
In this paper, we examine the MUM effect in a software development project context by
conducting a role-playing experiment focusing on two factors that have not been previously
investigated but which are hypothesized to influence the willingness to report bad news about
project status: (1) fault responsibility, and (2) time urgency.
In today’s software development environment, companies are increasingly relying on
external vendors for their software development. When such projects go awry, the vendor is
often at fault and becomes a ready target for blame (Bulkeley 1996; Stein 1998). While prior
research investigated the effect of a blame-shifting opportunity on IT project status reporting
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(Keil et al. 2007), fault responsibility was neither clearly manipulated nor empirically tested. In
this paper, we directly manipulate fault responsibility so that we can examine its effect on IT
project status reporting within the rubric of the whistle-blowing model.
Time urgency is a well-known factor that influences human behaviors including decisionmaking (Waller et al. 2001). While Smith and Keil (2003) theorized that time pressure might
affect an individual’s bad news reporting, this has not been empirically investigated. In this
research, we examine time urgency as a surrogate for time pressure in the bad news reporting
context.
Both fault responsibility and time urgency have become particularly relevant in today’s
software development environment that emphasizes rapid application development and
increasing reliance on third parties (e.g., outsourcing partners) to create key software
components (or entire systems) rather than developing them in-house. This study represents the
first time that these two factors have been empirically investigated using a theoretically grounded
model.

3.2

Theoretical Background
The theoretical framework for this study comes from whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near

1992) which holds that individuals undertake a predictable series of assessments in deciding
whether or not to report (see Figure 3.1). Dozier and Miceli (1985) argued that once an
individual is aware of a problem, he or she first decides whether or not the bad news ought to be
reported, then considers whether he or she is responsible for taking action, which in turn
influences his or her willingness to report. IS researchers have adopted this central model as a
general outline of individual decision-making regarding bad news reporting (Keil et al. 2004;
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Smith and Keil 2003; Smith et al. 2001). We also adopt the central model as a building block for
developing an expanded model in two areas: fault responsibility and time urgency.

Assessment:
Status ought to be
reported

+

Assessment:
Personal responsibility
to report

+

Willingness
to report

Figure 3.1 Basic Whistle-Blowing Model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985)

3.2.1

Attributions and Behavior
An attribution is an expression of the way people think about the relationship between a

cause and an outcome (Munton et al. 1999). People make attributions about their own and
others’ behaviors, about incidents, and about anything that requires a causal explanation.
Attribution theory, which is about how people make causal explanations, introduces two types of
attribution: internal and external (Munton et al. 1999). While an external attribution assigns
causality to situational factors or outside agents, an internal attribution assigns causality to
factors within the person.
Relationships between attributions and individual behaviors have been discussed in the
attribution literature (Eiser 1983). For example, Fincham (1983) has applied attribution theory to
clinical psychology and suggested from the analysis of multiple clinical cases that attributions
affect individual behavior. Attribution theory has also been used to explain the effects of
attributions on individuals’ behaviors in a variety of other contexts such as health (King 1983),
job search, and relationship marketing (Munton et al. 1999). Shultz and Schleifer (1983) suggest
that responsibility (i.e., who is responsible for the problem) is a central factor in the attribution
process. Since attributions affect behavior, it is reasonable to assume that fault responsibility
may affect an individual’s reporting behavior.
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3.2.2

Time and Behavior
Urgency comes from the Latin word, urgentia, meaning pressure (Price 1982). Time

pressure is regarded as externally imposed urgency to accomplish a task (Staudenmayer et al.
2002). Time pressure, in the form of tight time constraints, can induce an individual to perceive a
situation as being time-urgent.
A time constraint exists when there is a time deadline. Time urgency indicates that the
time constraint induces some feeling of stress and creates a need to act within the limited time
frame (Ordonez and Benson 1997). Time urgency has been shown to be a factor that can
influence an individual’s decision-making (Bronner 1982). Waller and her colleague (2001)
propose that individual perceptions of a time urgent situation affect individual behaviors. In
addition, Smith and Keil (2003) have suggested theoretically that time urgency may affect an
individual's reporting behavior in the software project context. While prior IS research has
empirically tested the basic whistle-blowing model in the context of such factors as risk, level of
behavioral immorality (Smith et al. 2001), and information asymmetry (Keil et al. 2004), there
has not been any empirical investigation of how time urgency fits within the rubric of the model.
In this paper, we use the basic whistle-blowing model as a foundation upon which to
build a richer model that incorporates fault responsibility and time urgency. In the next section,
we describe our research model and hypotheses, which is followed by a discussion of our
methodology and results.

3.3

Research Model
Numerous factors have been identified in the literature as having the potential to affect an

individual’s willingness to report bad news on a troubled software project (Smith and Keil 2003).
Since it would appear impossible for any one study to test all of these factors, the approach that
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has been taken to date involves testing a small number of factors at a time and seeing how they
relate to the constructs in the basic whistle-blowing model. In this study, we follow this approach,
having selected two such factors that we believe to be important, but which have yet to be
empirically tested in the context of the basic whistle-blowing model. We explicitly state six
hypotheses corresponding to the six paths in the research model, as depicted in Figure 3.2.

Perceived
fault
responsibility

H3
+

+
Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
+
+
H5

+

H2
+

H4

Willingness
to report

H6

Perceived
time urgency

Figure 3.2 Research Model

3.3.1

Central Decision-Making Model
The middle row of Figure 3.2 (in the box) represents the central decision-making model

grounded in the whistle-blowing literature. As for the whistle-blowing model, we adopt two
hypotheses that were shown to hold in recent research (Keil et al. 2004), and retest them here as
a replication.
Although the whistle-blowing literature posits that the individual will make two distinct
assessments of whether the bad news ought to be reported and the personal responsibility to
report the bad news (Dozier and Miceli 1985), the two are inherently related. Other things being
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equal, an individual’s stronger assessment that status information ought to be reported will be
reflected in a stronger feeling of personal responsibility for reporting. Hence, the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. A stronger assessment that information ought to be communicated will be
reflected in a higher assessed level of personal responsibility for reporting.
Following the line of argument from the whistle-blowing literature (Miceli and Near
1992) and some empirical support from the IS literature (Keil et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2001),
there should be a direct effect between personal responsibility and willingness to report bad news.
Hence, the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of assessed personal responsibility will be associated with
greater willingness to report bad news.
We now turn to the two additional factors that influence the central model.
3.3.2

Influencing Factors
Prior research has noted that the inclusion of other factors could strengthen the studies on

explaining the variance in reporting behavior (Tan et al. 2003). Thus it is necessary for
researchers to identify and test other factors that may influence bad news reporting. In this
research, we focus on two such factors that have been proposed in the literature but which have
not been empirically tested to determine their respective impact on bad news reporting: fault
responsibility and time urgency.
3.3.2.1 Fault Responsibility
In this study, the presence of an “at fault” external vendor was hypothesized to affect bad
news reporting because it provides a mechanism for causal attribution. Without an “at fault”
external vendor, individuals may be reluctant to report bad news because of a fear of being held
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responsible for having caused the problem and resulting bad consequences that would likely
occur. Conversely, when there is an external vendor onto which responsibility can be assigned,
individuals may be more willing to report bad news because they are less likely to face reprisals.
In establishing the theoretical linkage between fault responsibility and the decision of
whether something ought to be reported, we draw upon the general risk literature which suggests
that perceived risk is negatively associated with the level of control one has in a given situation
(Koonce et al. 2005; March and Shapira 1987). In a troubled software project, individuals in the
organization will feel less controllability for the project when the core modules of the project are
managed by a vendor rather than when they are managed internally. This feeling of less
controllability can be ascribed to restricted windows of observing emerging problems, limited
knowledge of gauging solvability of emerged problems, and delayed manifestation of problems
to individuals in the organization. Thus, individuals may feel that they may not able to address
the problems effectively in a timely manner when the troubled modules are in the hands of a
vendor, leading to a higher level of perceived risk (i.e., emergency or crisis). The cognitive
literature echoes this argument by suggesting that controllability plays a primary role in shaping
judgments of risk (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Slovic 1987).
This heightened feeling of emergency or crisis will lead to the assessment that negative
information ought to be reported. The presence of an at-fault external vendor for attribution will
make individuals feel less responsible for the problem, allowing them to assign the responsibility
easily to the vendor. In this research, we seek to examine more specifically whether fault
responsibility affects an individual’s assessment that the status ought to be reported within the
rubric of the basic whistle-blowing model derived from Dozier and Miceli (1985). Hence:
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Hypothesis 3. When fault responsibility can be placed on an external vendor, individuals
are more likely to assess that negative information ought to be reported.
In order to understand the effect of fault responsibility on an individual’s reporting
behavior, we turn to attribution theory which suggests that individuals are likely to engage in
causal attribution processing when an event is associated with negative, unexpected, or important
consequences (Weiner 1986). People often go beyond causal attribution, and make judgments
regarding who should be held accountable for an event and assign responsibility to a blamed
target (Fincham and Jaspars 1980; Jaspars et al. 1983). In a troubled software project involving
an “at fault” vendor, responsibility for the problem is likely to be attributed to the vendor
because there is a perception that the vendor should have been able to anticipate and correct the
problem. For that reason alone, one might reasonably expect that when fault responsibility rests
with the vendor, the individual will be more likely to report the problem.
Additionally, prior research shows that responsibility can affect an individual’s
information processing strategy (Tetlock 1983). For example, when people feel responsible for a
problem, they are more likely to engage in effortful information processing to solve the problem
(Janis and Mann 1977), whereas if they do not feel responsible they are likely to adopt a lazy
information processing strategy (Chaiken 1980). This would suggest that when fault
responsibility cannot be assigned to the vendor, individuals will resist reporting the bad news,
instead choosing to delay reporting while they attempt to resolve the issue. Conversely, when
fault responsibility rests with the vendor, individuals will be more likely to report because it
requires no effort to do so.
The escalation literature (Staw 1976) provides additional support for the notion that
individuals will be less likely to report bad news when they cannot avoid fault responsibility.
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Specifically, escalation theory suggests that when an individual is responsible for a failing course
of action, he or she will be more likely to commit further resources to that course of action. In
the context of our research, this would imply that individuals will be less likely to report bad
news when they have fault responsibility.
The whistle-blowing literature also suggests that fear of being held responsible can
inhibit an individual’s willingness to report bad news (Dozier and Miceli 1985). Therefore, when
fault responsibility rests with the vendor, this should remove one of the major factors that inhibit
bad news reporting. In such circumstances, individuals can freely report bad news without
necessarily exposing themselves to the costs that would normally be associated with blowing the
whistle, as they are unlikely to be held responsible for project failure or delay. Thus, we state the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. When fault responsibility can be placed on an external vendor, individuals
will be more willing to report bad news.
3.3.2.2 Time Urgency
Billings, Milburn, and Schaalman (1980) suggest that without a sense of time urgency “a
problem will be left to the future” and that “The more distant a future negative consequence, the
less negative it will seem. The full adverse impact of a negative outcome … is not perceived
when it is believed to be far away”. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that an individual is less
likely to perceive that something ought to be reported in the absence of time urgency.
Based on the time urgency literature, Smith and Keil (2003) argue that when time
urgency is perceived to be high, individuals may be more willing to report bad news than when
time urgency is perceived to be low. While they also suggest theoretically that time urgency is
directly associated with the assessment of whether the project status ought to be reported, there
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has been no empirical research to substantiate this. Thus we propose to test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. When higher levels of time urgency are perceived, individuals are more
likely to assess that the bad news concerning a project and its status ought to be reported.
Many studies in the psychology literature show that the Type A behavior pattern is
associated with time urgency (Conte et al. 1995; Conte et al. 1998; Landy et al. 1991; Rastegary
and Landy 1993). The Type A behavior pattern characterizes those individuals having a set of
overt behaviors such as extremes of competitiveness, time urgency, easily aroused hostility, and
hypervigilance (Friedman and Rosenman 1974), and it actually refers to a specific pattern of
behaviors rather than the overall personality of an individual. Notably, some physical and social
environmental conditions such as a time urgent situation may encourage or discourage the
acquisition and maintenance of Type A behavior (Price 1982). In addition, Furnham, Hillard, and
Brewin (1985) have investigated the relationship between the Type A behavior pattern and
reaction to negative outcomes. Their findings suggest that individuals showing the Type A
behavior pattern may be more likely to perceive that they have personal responsibility for the
events that occur in their lives. Thus, the Type A behavior pattern literature suggests a possible
association between time urgency and personal responsibility, at least for those individuals who
exhibit Type A behavior.
There have also been a few studies in the time urgency literature that imply a relationship
between time urgency and personal responsibility (Conte et al. 1995; Waller et al. 1999). Time
urgent events in an organization may increase an individual’s perception of time urgency and
even encourage Type A behavior (Price 1982). An individual who is induced into this behavior
pattern is more attentive to time and deadlines (Burnham et al. 1975; Yarnold and Grimm 1982).
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Taken the above discussions together, it is reasonable to assume that when individuals in a
troubled software project perceive higher levels of time urgency, they will be more likely to feel
responsible for reporting the project’s status in this context, particularly if they feel that it might
help get the project back on schedule or avoid negative outcomes associated with a delay. Thus,
we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. When higher levels of time urgency are perceived, individuals are more
likely to assess a personal responsibility to report a project’s status.
In summary, while prior literature has suggested that both fault responsibility and time
urgency may affect bad news reporting behavior, the full nature of the relationships between
these variables and the basic whistle-blowing model has not been empirically studied. In this
study, we examine empirically the effects of fault responsibility and time urgency on bad news
reporting behavior by investigating how these variables exert their influence on the central
decision model from whistle-blowing theory shown in Figure 3.2.

3.4

Research Methodology
An experiment was conducted to test the causal relationships between constructs in the

research model. The experiment involves a two-factor, four-cell design with two exogenous
variables (fault responsibility and time urgency) that are manipulated independently at two levels.
We developed four treatment scenarios as well as the measurement items for assessing those
constructs for which we were unable to identify reliable and valid measures. An iterative series
of pilot tests was conducted to refine the treatment scenarios and validate the measures. College
students at a large university in the southeastern U.S. served as subjects in this process.
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3.4.1

Scenario
Each subject was asked to read a short scenario about a troubled software called CAPS

and to assume the role of a project team member (see Appendix 3A). Subjects were informed
that the CAPS project consisted of two core software modules and that a serious problem has
been identified in one of the two modules. The subject’s company has promised that the CAPS
project will be installed and fully operational for a key customer within a specified time-frame.
Fault responsibility and time urgency were manipulated independently to yield four treatment
conditions.
For the low fault responsibility manipulation, an external vendor was introduced and
subjects were informed that the faulty module was one which the vendor was responsible for
developing. In this treatment condition, the subject was informed that he or she would not be
responsible for the problematic module. For the high fault responsibility manipulation, there was
no external vendor involved and subjects were informed that both modules were being developed
internally. In this treatment condition, the subject was informed that he or she was responsible
for the problematic module.
Time urgency was manipulated by varying the amount of time left between problem
identification and the point at which the problem would cause difficulties if left unresolved. For
the high time urgency manipulation, subjects were informed that the project was to be delivered
within 1 month and that it was urgent that the code defects be resolved soon, or delivery of the
project would be delayed. For the low time urgency manipulation, subjects were informed that
the project was to be delivered within 12 months and that there was no particular urgency that
the code defects be resolved soon, nor much risk that the project would be delayed.
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3.4.2

Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions. The

experimental procedure consisted of two parts. In the first part, subjects received a copy of the
scenario corresponding to their respective treatment conditions and were asked to read the
scenario. In the second part, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire that measured their
willingness to report bad news and also answered several items regarding their perceptions of
fault responsibility and time urgency; their assessments of whether the information concerning
the project ought to be reported; their assessments of whether they have a personal responsibility
to report the information; and manipulation check. They were then asked to provide some basic
demographic information.
3.4.3

Subjects
A total of 192 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory information systems

course at a large urban university in the southeastern United States were recruited for the study.
Thirty-three subjects were dropped from the subject pool either because they did not pass the
manipulation checks or because they failed to complete the questionnaire. The mean age of the
remaining 159 subjects was 22.8 years and the mean work experience was 2.6 years.
Approximately 60 percent of the subjects had at least one year of work experience. Forty-five
percent of the subjects were male, and 55 percent were female.
While the use of student subjects can limit the generalizability of results, student subjects
are commonly used in experiments that probe human decision-making (Harrison and Harrell
1993; Sitkin and Weingart 1995). Moreover, there is some support in the literature for using
student subjects as surrogates for organizational decision makers (DeSanctis 1989; Gordon et al.
1987; Remus 1986), especially when the decision-making task does not require highly
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specialized domain knowledge. In this study, the subjects were asked to adopt the role of a team
member in a software project, not of a leader or a manager. The roles of team members in a
software development project were discussed in the software development life cycle (SDLC)
topic of their information systems course, and the subjects had an average of 1.7 years work
experience as a member of a software development team. Thus, we believe that the subjects were
able to appreciate the context of the scenario and it is reasonable to assume that they could
project themselves into the role of a software project team member for the purposes of the
experiment.
3.4.4

Measures
Multi-item measures for willingness to report bad news, perceived fault responsibility,

and perceived time urgency were developed for this study. We also adopted existing multi-item
measures for assessments of whether the project status ought to be reported and personal
responsibility to report (Smith et al. 2001). A single-item dichotomous measure was created as a
manipulation check for time urgency. All measurement scales were validated through extensive
pilot testing of the experimental materials involving six rounds of experimentation aimed at finetuning the scenario, the manipulations, and the instrumentation.
The willingness to report bad news was measured using three items that were anchored
on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (7). All of the
other multi-item measures were assessed on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).
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3.5

Results

3.5.1

Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were performed to verify that the fault responsibility and time

urgency manipulations were effective, following the procedure used in the literature (Keil et al.
2004; Perdue and Summers 1986; Smith et al. 2001). Composite measures were created for
perceived fault responsibility and perceived time urgency by averaging the two items for each
(see Appendix 3B). The Cronbach’s alphas (0.75 and 0.95) were deemed adequate for both.
Figure 3.3 shows the mean values for perceived time urgency (1 = low time urgency; 7 = high
time urgency) and perceived fault responsibility (1 = low fault responsibility; 7 = high fault
responsibility) across the four treatment groups.

N = 41
Time Urgency

1 Month
(High)

pTU
pFR

N = 40
Mean (S.D.)
6.39 (0.71)
1.80 (0.82)

N = 38
12 Months
(Low)

pTU
pFR

pTU
pFR

Mean (S.D.)
6.36 (0.71)
4.19 (1.56)

N = 40
Mean (S.D.)
5.18 (1.29)
1.92 (0.88)
Low

pTU
pFR

Mean (S.D.)
5.01 (1.14)
4.12 (1.51)
High

Fault Responsibility
Figure 3.3 Perceived Fault Responsibility and Perceived Time Urgency by Treatment
Condition
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As Figure 3.3 shows, the means move in the expected direction from cell-to-cell,
indicating that the manipulations are effective. A 2x2 multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was performed with perceived fault responsibility and perceived time urgency as the dependent
variables and the treatment conditions as the independent variables (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Results of 2×2 MANOVA
Dependent
Variables

Perceived Time Urgency

Perceived Fault Responsibility

Independent
Variables

Sum of
Squares

F-value (Sig.)

Sum of
Squares

F-value (Sig.)

Main effect:
(1) time urgency
manipulation

64.287

65.484 (0.000)

0.024

0.015 (0.902)

Main effect:
(2) fault responsibility
manipulation

0.407

0.414 (0.521)

208.005

134.941 (0.000)

Interaction effect:
(1) × (2)

0.195

0.198 (0.657)

0.332

0.215 (0.643)

It was expected that the main effects of each manipulated variable would be strongly
significant on its respective dependent variable (i.e., time urgency manipulation on perceived
time urgency and fault responsibility manipulation on perceived fault responsibility), but have no
significant relationship with the other dependent variable. As seen in the first and second data
rows of Table 3.1, this was indeed the case. The third row shows that there are no interaction
effects. Thus each manipulation produced the intended effect.
3.5.2

Partial Least Squares Analysis
Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis (with PLS Graph version 3.0) was used for

measurement validation and for testing the paths hypothesized in the research model shown
earlier in Figure 3.2. PLS analysis was considered appropriate for this study because it places

68

minimal demands on measurement scales, sample size, and distributional assumptions (Chin
1998; Fornell and Bookstein 1982). In addition, the use of PLS helps us easily compare the
results of this study with those of previous bad news reporting studies (Keil et al. 2004; Smith et
al. 2001) since they have used PLS in their analyses. Before testing the structural model, the
measurement model must be established by examining the psychometric properties of the
measures. A measurement model connects each construct with a set of indicators measuring that
construct while a structural model represents a network of causal relationships among multiple
constructs in the research model.
3.5.3

Measurement Model

3.5.3.1 Convergent Validity
To evaluate convergent validity of each factor model, we first examined standardized
loadings. The standardized loadings should be greater than 0.707 for the shared variance between
each item and its associated construct to exceed the error variance. Table 3.2 shows that all the
loadings exceed this threshold.
Table 3.2 Item Loadings and Construct Measurement Properties
Construct
Perceived Time
Urgency
Perceived Fault
Responsibility
Assessment Status Ought to Be
Reported

Standardized
Loading

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Composite
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted

pTU1

.923

0.750

0.899

0.817

pTU2

.887

pFR1

.977

0.948

0.975

0.951

pFR2

.973

OTR1

.901

0.777

0.880

0.710

OTR2

.853

OTR3

.768

RSR1

.906

0.752

0.862

0.678

0.927

0.955

0.875

Item

Assessment Personal
Responsibility to
Report

RSR2

.718

RSR3

.836

Willingness to

WTR1

.956
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Report

WTR2

.948

WTR3

.902

We also examined Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance
extracted. Composite reliability and average variance extracted for each construct were
calculated according to the procedure outlined in the literature (Gerbing and Anderson 1988).
The acceptable levels for composite reliability and average variance extracted are 0.7 or higher
(Yi and Davis 2003) and 0.5 or higher (Fornell and Larcker 1981), respectively. Table 3.2 shows
that these thresholds were exceeded for each construct.
3.5.3.2 Discriminant Validity
We conducted two tests for discriminant validity. First, each indicator’s loading on its
own construct and its cross-loading on all other constructs were calculated (Chin 1998). Table
3.3 shows that the loadings for the intended indicators for each construct are higher than the
cross-loadings for indicators from other constructs. Moreover, each indicator has a higher
loading with its intended construct than a cross-loading with any other construct.
Table 3.3 Loadings and Cross-Loadings
Construct
1. Perceived
Time Urgency (pTU)

Item
pTU1
pTU2

2. Perceived
Fault Responsibility (pFR)

1
.927
.882

2
.244
.151

3
.308
.228

4
.298
.252

5
.251
.143

pFR1
pFR2

.248
.184

.977
.973

.412
.375

.276
.258

.303
.275

3. Assessment Status Ought to Be
Reported (OTR)

OTR1
OTR2
OTR3

.239
.299
.221

.435
.280
.300

.901
.853
.770

.582
.596
.443

.656
.499
.511

4. Assessment Personal Responsibility
to Report (RSR)

RSR1
RSR2
RSR3

.265
.221
.269

.295
.109
.236

.645
.427
.494

.906
.718
.836

.545
.261
.470

5. Willingness to Report (WTR)

WTR1
WTR2
WTR3

.150
.118
.155

.193
.202
.186

.479
.446
.455

.394
.377
.338

.956
.949
.902
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Second, we compared average variance extracted for each construct with the shared
variance between all possible pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 3.4 shows
that average variance extracted for each construct is higher than the squared correlation between
the construct pairs, which indicates that more variance is shared between the latent construct and
its block of indicators than with another construct representing a different block of indicators.
Thus, it also establishes discriminant validity.
Table 3.4 AVEs versus Squares of Correlations between Constructs

3.5.4

Construct

Average Variance Extracted
(AVE)

pTU

pFR

OTR

RSR

WTR

pTU
pFR
OTR
RSR
WTR

0.82
0.95
0.71
0.68
0.88

0.05
0.09
0.09
0.05

0.16
0.08
0.09

0.42
0.44

0.29

-

Structural Model
The structural model was assessed by examining path coefficients and their significance

levels. The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated by examining the R2 value
of the final dependent construct. The final dependent construct, willingness to report bad news,
had an R2 value of 0.32, indicating that the research model accounts for 32% of the variance in
the dependent variable. It is also instructive to examine the R2 values for the intermediate
variables in the structural model. The R2 value for “personal responsibility to report” and “status
ought to be reported” were 0.43 and 0.22, respectively. It is apparent that the R2 values are
sufficiently high to make interpretation of the path coefficients meaningful. In particular, 32% of
the variance explained in the final dependent variable stands as compelling evidence of the
research model’s explanatory power, and is comparable to results obtained in prior studies that
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have examined other factors that influence bad news reporting (Keil et al. 2004; Smith et al.
2001). In particular, Smith et al. (2001) reported an R2 of 24% for a model that investigated the
effects of perceived wrongdoing and perceived impact and Keil et al. (2004) reported an R2 of
38% for a model that investigated the effects of perceived information asymmetry and perceived
organizational climate.
We computed path coefficients in the structural model with the entire sample, and
employed the bootstrapping method (with 500 resamples) to obtain the t-values corresponding to
each path (see Figure 3.4). The acceptable t-values for two-tailed tests are 1.96 and 2.58 at the
significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01. The assessment of whether the status ought to be reported
had a direct positive effect on the assessment of personal responsibility to report, supporting H1
(β = 0.61, p < 0.01). The assessment of personal responsibility to report had a direct positive
effect on the willingness to report bad news, which means that subjects were more willing to
report when they perceived themselves to be personally responsible for reporting the bad news.
Thus, H2 is supported (β = 0.49, p < 0.01). Perceived fault responsibility had an indirect positive
effect through the assessment of whether the status ought to be reported (β = 0.35, p < 0.01) as
well as a direct positive effect on the willingness to report bad news (β = 0.16, p < 0.05), thus
supporting both H3 an H4. Perceived time urgency had a positive effect on the assessment of
whether the status ought to be reported (β = 0.22, p < 0.01) and on the assessment of personal
responsibility to report (β = 0.12, p < 0.05), thus supporting both H5 and H6.
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Perceived
fault
responsibility

0.35
(t = 5.46)

H3

Assessment:
Status ought to be
reported

0.61
(t = 10.3)

R2 = 0.22
0.22
(t = 2. 67)

Assessment:
Personal responsibility
to report

H1

R2 = 0.43

H6

H5

H4

H2
0.49
(t = 7.07 )

0.16
(t = 2.18)

Willingness
to report
R2 = 0.32

0.12
(t = 2.01)

Perceived
time urgency

Figure 3.4 Structural Model

3.5.5

Safeguarding Against and Assessing Common Method Bias
In order to examine the existence of common method bias, we conducted a latent variable

approach of adding a first-order factor with all of the measures in the theoretical model as
indicators (Podsakoff et al. 2003). A common method factor was therefore added in the research
model (Liang et al. 2007) and the results demonstrate that the average substantively explained
variance of the indicators is 0.786, whereas the average method-based variance is 0.017. The
ratio of substantive variance to method variance is 46:1. Thus, common method bias is unlikely
to be a serious concern in this study.

3.6

Discussion and Implications
Before discussing the implications of our study, we note that all studies have limitations

and ours is no exception. While the experimental approach provides a highly controlled
environment for hypothesis testing, it does pose some methodological limitations. First, our
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experiment is based on role playing scenarios. In crafting the scenario we tried to be as realistic
as possible while controlling extraneous sources of variance, and providing only the essential
information needed for role-playing and decision-making. Clearly, there are many organizational
and political factors that may also influence an individual’s willingness to report bad news.
Second, the decision choice presented to the subjects in our experiment represents a necessarily
narrow and simplified view of the options available to one who is faced with the decision of
whether and how to report a troubled project’s status. In this study, we framed this situation as a
binary choice of whether or not to report the project status to his or her boss. Clearly, the team
member can make other choices in responding to such a situation, such as working overtime to
solve the code defects, enlisting the aid of other team member, trying to solve the problem
together with the vendor, or deciding to report through some other channel. Third, we have
measured subjects’ self-reported behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors. There is no
guarantee that subjects would actually behave as they have indicated. Despite these limitations,
the strong relationships among the constructs in our model and its explanatory power shed new
light on some important factors that can influence the willingness to report bad news. Thus, we
believe that the study represents a significant contribution to our understanding of this
phenomenon.
This study demonstrates that perceived fault responsibility and perceived time urgency
can both have significant effects on an individual’s willingness to transmit bad news. Fault
responsibility affects an individual’s willingness to report directly and indirectly through the
assessment of whether the status ought to be reported. The presence of an “at fault” vendor
provides a context that allows individuals to easily disassociate themselves from the problematic
situation. In doing so, they are able to assign responsibility to the vendor and are freed from fault
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responsibility. Managers may be able to take advantage of the fact that individuals are more
willing to report bad news when there is an opportunity to assign responsibility to an outside
vendor. Given the growth in outsourced projects, this means that managers will increasingly find
themselves in the position where their employees will find it easier to report problems. In order
to capitalize on this strategy, however, managers must establish adequate monitoring systems
that allow their employees to obtain accurate status information regarding work that is
outsourced to a vendor. If the performance monitoring on the vendor is inadequate or the vendor
is able to conceal the true status of their work packages, the approach will fail.
When problems occur on projects, managers need to be cautious about focusing too
heavily on assigning fault responsibility as this can be counter-productive. In all cases, it seems
clear that an organization should foster an environment where it is possible for individuals to
report bad news without incurring severe costs. While it would be nice to believe that this can
happen without finger pointing, our results suggest that it will be easier for individuals to come
forward and report bad news when fault responsibility rests with an external vendor.
Like fault responsibility, time urgency affects an individual’s assessment of whether the
project status ought to be reported. Time urgency also affects an individual’s assessment of
whether he or she has personal responsibility to report the status of a troubled software project.
Thus, it seems that time urgency first influences behavior in an indirect fashion by affecting an
individual’s perception of his or her situation (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Thomas et al. 1993).
The indirect effect of time urgency on human behavior or decision-making (i.e., willingness to
report) is meaningful in the organizational context because it means that managers can control
individuals’ willingness to report by generating a time urgent situation such as a deadline. Waller
et al. (2001) develop theoretically derived propositions describing how individuals’ deadline
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perceptions affect their deadline-oriented behaviors under deadlines with different time horizons.
Our results are consistent with the findings of Waller at al. (2001) and suggest that time urgency
affects an individual’s decision-making through his or her perception of status.
There has been some controversy over the direct linkage between time urgency and
willingness to report. Many studies in the decision-making literature suggest that an individual’s
sense of time urgency significantly affects decision-making processes. Some of them show that
people may change information-processing strategies to cope with the situation as their sense of
time urgency increases (Christensen-Szalanski 1980; Smith et al. 1982; Zakay 1985). For
example, in a time urgent situation, a decision-maker may speed up information processing (Ben
Zur and Breznitz 1981; Payne et al. 1988), or reduce the amount of information to be processed
(Wright 1974). However, the effect of these changes in information processing may or may not
have direct influence over an individual’s willingness to report bad news. For some individuals,
the increased time urgency may result in a more focused search for a solution to the problem and
a delay in reporting the bad news (under the hope that the problem can be resolved). For other
individuals, the increased time urgency may cause them to perceive the situation as hopeless,
causing them to give up trying to solve the problem (Durham et al. 2000) and accelerating their
willingness to report the bad news. For this reason, we did not posit a direct linkage between
time urgency and willingness to report. We did, however, perform a post-hoc test to determine if
there was such a linkage, but it was not found to be statistically significant.

3.7

Contributions and Directions for Future Research
Smith and Keil (2003) argued that an individual’s assessment of whether or not the status

ought to be reported is likely to be associated with the individual’s perceptions of the project
situation. They expanded the basic whistle-blowing model theoretically by suggesting additional
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constructs that may affect perceptions of a project situation, such as risk, time pressure, level of
behavioral immorality, and information asymmetry. Some IS research has empirically tested
these additional constructs’ effects on the central decision-making model. For example, Smith et
al. (2001) have empirically examined level of behavioral immorality and risk and Keil et al.
(2004) have tested information asymmetry. These studies have confirmed the importance of
these three factors on the individual’s assessment of whether or not the status ought to be
reported, which lends support for Smith and Keil’s (2003) theoretical model. Our study
empirically examined the effect of time urgency as a surrogate for time pressure, which is the
one factor that had not been previously tested among the four factors in their theoretical model.
Our results provide confirmatory evidence that time urgency does affect an individual’s
assessment of whether or not the status ought to be reported. Thus, one major contribution of our
study is to complete the empirical testing of Smith and Keil’s (2003) theoretical model which
represents an extension of the basic whistle-blowing model.
Another contribution of our study is the introduction of time urgency to IS research. Time
urgency is a well-known factor that can influence human behavior and has been studied in other
contexts such as psychology, but there has been little research on time urgency in the IS context.
Our study examines how people make a decision in a troubled software project situation under
different levels of time urgency, and the results show that time urgency influences the
individual’s reporting behavior in a troubled software project.
Finally, this study confirms the effect of fault responsibility on the willingness to report
bad news and clearly establishes that fault responsibility has both a direct and indirect influence
on willingness to report. Since this is the first study that has investigated the effect of fault

77

responsibility on willingness to report bad news, this represents a significant contribution to our
understanding of reporting behavior.
Although our study confirms the effect of time urgency postulated by Smith and Keil’s
(2003) theoretical model and shows how the fault responsibility fits into the rubric of the basic
whistle-blowing model derived from Dozier and Miceli (1985), there may be other factors that
can also affect perceptions of the project situation. These, too, may influence willingness to
report bad news in a troubled software project. Theoretically identifying and empirically testing
these factors represent a worthwhile goal for future research and may allow further extension of
the basic whistle-blowing model in the context of software project management. While the
scenarios for this study were crafted around a software project context, we believe that the
pattern of results would likely hold for certain other types of projects such as high technology
innovation projects. It would be, however, an interesting avenue of future research to replicate
this study with different types of projects.
While both fault responsibility and time urgency are situational variables, an individual’s
perception of time urgency is more likely to be affected by the individual’s personal
characteristics such as sensitivity to time. In this study, we did not measure the subjects’ personal
characteristics and assumed that subjects had a similar level of sensitivity to time urgency.
Future research may be able to address this individual-difference issue of time urgency. A more
nuanced approach to the study of time urgency that takes into account such individual
differences in time sensitivity may allow us to better understand why and how time urgency
affects individuals’ decision making in the context of reporting bad news.
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Appendix 3A. Experimental Scenario and Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS: The business case that follows is part of a study that examines business
decision-making. Please take a few minutes to read over the case and to answer the
questionnaire that follows. There are no right or wrong answers.

Software Solutions Corporation
You work for Software Solutions Corporation (SSC), a U.S. computer software company
that specializes in software solutions designed to meet specific customer needs.
You are working on a project called CAPS which consists of 2 core modules. SSC has
promised a customer that the CAPS system will be installed and fully operational 1 month
from now.
Before you joined the project, SSC had already contracted with an external software
company called IN-TECH to develop and supply one of the core modules. This is the first time
that SSC has ever used IN-TECH as a supplier and the contract clearly specifies that INTECH is responsible for any project delays resulting from code defects in their module. In
other words, you will not be blamed for any project delays that can be traced to INTECH’s module. Last week, you began working to integrate the 2 core modules. However,
you discovered major code defects in IN-TECH’s module.
Since the CAPS system will be installed in 1 month, it is urgent that the code defects be
resolved soon, or delivery of the project will be delayed.
At this point, you are now wondering whether or not you should immediately report the
bad news to your boss. If you report the bad news and the project is delayed, you could lose
your job if you are found to be responsible for the delay.
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The above scenario represents the treatment used to manipulate high time urgency and low fault
responsibility. The treatment for high time urgency and high fault responsibility is identical
except for the third paragraph, which the following paragraph is substitute for:
Last week, you began working to integrate the 2 core modules. However, you
discovered major code defects in one of the modules that was YOUR responsibility.

The treatments for low time urgency are identical to the above scenarios except that the second
and fourth paragraphs of the scenarios are replaced with the following paragraphs:
You are working on a project called CAPS which consists of 2 core modules. SSC has
promised a customer that the CAPS system will be installed and fully operational 12 months
from now.
Since the CAPS system will not be installed for another 12 months, there is no
particular urgency that the code defects be resolved soon, nor is there much risk that the project
will be delayed.
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Appendix 3B. Constructs, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics

Willingness to Report Bad News
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely)
WTR1

5.31

1.66 Please indicate your willingness to IMMEDIATELY (i.e.,
RIGHT NOW) report the bad news to your boss.

WTR2

5.14

1.61 At this time, how likely are you to go directly to your boss
by yourself to report the bad news concerning the project’s
status?

WTR3
2.87
(reversed)

1.80 Please indicate how likely it is that you would avoid telling
your boss the bad news.

Assessment of Responsibility to Report
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
RSR1

5.64

1.20 I believe that I have a personal responsibility to make more
information about the status of the CAPS project known to
my boss.

RSR2
2.63
(reversed)

1.50 I believe that it is not my responsibility to make more
information about the status of the CAPS project known to
my boss.

RSR3

1.25 I believe that it is my personal duty to tell my boss about the
project’s status.

5.44

Assessment of Whether Something Ought to Be Reported
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
OTR1

5.73

1.14 I believe that something should be done to make more
information about the status of the CAPS project known to
my boss.

OTR2
2.41
(reversed)

1.32 I don’t believe that it really matters whether more
information about the status of the CAPS project is made
known to my boss.

OTR3

1.62 Even if it is not me, I believe someone should tell my boss
about the status of the CAPS project.

5.43
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Perceived Time Urgency
Variable Mean s.d.
Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
pTU1

5.43

1.53

I believe that this matter is of considerable time urgency
given the schedule under which CAPS is to be installed.

pTU2

6.06

1.05

I believe that the problems must be solved quickly because
of the CAPS installation schedule.

Perceived Fault Responsibility
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
pFR1
3.03
(reversed)

1.74 If I reported the problem to my boss, I could show that the
problem was not caused by me.

pFR2
2.99
(reversed)

1.72 If I reported the problem to my boss, I could show that the
code defects were not my fault.

Construct Correlation Table
WTR
RSR

OTR

WTR

1

RSR

0.502**

1

OTR

0.655**

0.613**

1

pTU

0.229**

0.305**

0.301**

pTU

pFR

1

pFR
0.296**
0.250**
0.394**
0.225**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Chapter 4
Organizational Silence and Whistle-Blowing on IT Projects:
An Integrated Model 4
Abstract
An individual’s reluctance to report bad news about a troubled IT project has been
suggested as an important contributor to project failure and has been linked to IT project
escalation as well (Keil and Robey 2001; Keil et al. 2004; Smith and Keil 2003; Smith et al.
2001). To date, IS researchers have drawn from the MUM effect and whistle-blowing literature
to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence bad news reporting. More recent
theoretical work in the area of organizational silence offers a promising new conceptual lens, but
remains empirically untested. In this paper, we integrate key elements of Morrison and
Milliken’s (2000) model of organizational silence, which has never been empirically tested, with
the basic whistle-blowing model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985). Using a scenario
experiment, we investigate how organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and
degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers create a climate of
silence, and how this climate, in turn, affects an individual’s willingness to report. Our results
show that all three types of factors contribute to a climate of silence in an organization, exerting
both direct and indirect influence on willingness to report, as hypothesized. The implications of
these findings and directions for future research are discussed.
Keywords: Climate of silence, bad news reporting, whistle-blowing, organizational silence,
MUM effect, demographic dissimilarity
4

Park, C., and Keil, M. “Organizational Silence and Whistle-Blowing on IT Projects: An Integrated Model,”
Working paper, Department of Computer Information Systems, Georgia State University, 2007.
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4.1

Introduction
Project failure has been a serious problem in the information systems field. A recent

global survey shows that IT projects are still prone to failure nowadays (Zarrella et al. 2005).
While many reasons for IT project failure have been identified, a project member’s reluctance to
report bad news about the true status of an IT project has been recently recognized as an
important factor that may contribute to IT project failure (Tan et al. 2003). If an IT project
member withholds bad news about a project from his/her superiors, escalation of commitment to
a failing course of action may result. On the other hand, if bad news about a troubled project is
transmitted to upper managers, there is a chance that some actions can be taken to turn around
the project, or give it up if necessary. Prior research suggests, however, that, while some
evidence of pending failure may be apparent to project members in the lower ranks, this bad
news sometimes fails to be communicated up the hierarchy (Keil and Robey 1999).
To date, IS researchers have drawn from the MUM effect and whistle-blowing literature
to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence bad news reporting and their focus has
primarily been on personal and situational factors. In order to provide more insight into this
phenomenon, this study focuses on organizational factors and introduces a fresh theoretical
perspective. Specifically, we draw upon recent theoretical work in the area of organizational
silence which offers a promising new conceptual lens, but remains empirically untested. In this
paper, we integrate key elements of Morrison and Milliken’s (2000) model of organizational
silence, which has never been empirically tested, with the basic whistle-blowing model adapted
from Dozier and Miceli (1985).
Morrison and Milliken (2000) developed a theoretically grounded model of
organizational silence which suggests three types of factors that can bring about an
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organizational climate of silence: (1) organizational structures/policies, (2) managerial practices,
and (3) degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers.
Organizational structures/policies refer to the centralization of decision making and lack of
formal upward feedback mechanisms. Managerial practices refer to the manager’s tendency to
reject or respond negatively to dissent or negative feedback and lack of informal solicitation of
negative feedback. Degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers
refers to differences in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, and age.
In this research, we examined the three types of organizational factors identified by
Morrison and Milliken (2000), and tested the relationships among these factors, a climate of
silence, and the decision to report bad news. In order to investigate how the three types of
organizational factors contribute to a climate of silence, we manipulated them in a controlled
laboratory experiment by developing eight scenarios with two different levels for each type of
organizational factor. We also evaluated how the climate of silence affects an individual’s
decision to report (i.e., voice) or not (i.e., silence) within the rubric of the basic whistle-blowing
model.
This study represents the first time that the three types of organizational factors have been
empirically investigated using a theoretically grounded model. The remainder of the paper is
organized into five sections. First, we briefly review the theoretical background, focusing on bad
news reporting, organizational silence, and whistle-blowing. Next, we introduce the research
model and hypotheses. Then, we describe our research methodology. After we present the
experiment results, we conclude the paper with some discussion of the implications.
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4.2

Background

4.2.1

Situating this Study in Relation to Prior Research on Bad News Reporting
Prior research on bad news reporting in the IT project context has drawn upon the MUM

effect and whistle-blowing literature to hypothesize and test a variety of factors that may affect
the decision to report. In a theory paper, Smith and Keil (2003) identified four important
situational factors that can affect an individual’s bad news reporting: risk, time pressure, level of
behavioral immorality, and information asymmetry. These situational factors have been
empirically tested and confirmed in the IS literature (Keil et al. 2004; Park et al. 2006; Smith et
al. 2001). In terms of personal factors, Park, Keil, and Kim (2007) tested the effects of personal
morality and willingness to communicate on bad news reporting in the IT project context. Thus,
prior IS research on bad news reporting has mainly discussed situational and personal factors,
rather than organizational factors.
In terms of organizational factors, Keil et al (2004) examined the effect of organizational
climate on bad news reporting, but their operationalization of this construct and their model
specification was not theoretically grounded in the literature on organizational silence. Thus,
they tested neither the effect of organizational climate on the assessment of whether the bad
news ought to be reported, nor the direct effect of organizational climate on the willingness to
report bad news. In this study we operationalize a closely related construct, climate of silence,
and the types of organizational factors that give rise to it, but we do so in a theoretically
grounded fashion based on the organizational silence literature. We then examine the direct
effects that a climate of silence has on all three decision steps in the central decision-making
model from whistle-blowing theory. The integration of key constructs from the organizational
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silence literature with the basic whistle-blowing model represents our core theoretical
contribution.
4.2.2

Organizational Silence
Morrison and Milliken (2000, p. 706) have noted that “many organizations are caught in

an apparent paradox in which most employees know the truth about certain issues and problems
within the organization yet dare not speak that truth to their superiors.” They refer to this as
organizational silence or employee silence. While this silence phenomenon has been discussed
with different labels such as the MUM effect (or it’s opposite, whistle-blowing), the notion of
organizational silence has recently received research attention in the management literature
(Morrison and Milliken 2003) and represents a new perspective. Organizational silence differs
from the other related bodies of work (e.g., the MUM effect and whistle-blowing) in terms of its
approach to understanding the silence phenomenon. While the MUM effect and whistle-blowing
literatures emphasize an individual employee’s reporting decision, organizational silence focuses
more on collective-level dynamics. Additionally, organizational silence represents a more
inclusive approach to characterizing the silence phenomenon in an organization. For example,
while whistle-blowing seems to be limited to a wrongdoing situation, the notion of
organizational silence is not limited to any specific context, but covers widespread withholding
of information about potential problems or issues by employees (Morrison and Milliken 2000).
In this research, we have adopted this inclusive approach from the organizational silence
literature in defining bad news reporting in organizational settings. In doing so, we are not
limiting the origin of bad news to wrongdoing, but instead extending it to any potential problems
or issues.
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In addition to its inclusive approach, the organizational silence literature is focused on
organizational rather than personal factors. Morrison and Milliken (2000) developed a
theoretically grounded model of how silence unfolds within organizations. Their model suggests
that managers’ fear of negative feedback and a set of implicit managerial beliefs give rise to
organizational structures/policies and managerial practices that impede the upward flow of
information, which contribute to a climate of silence (meaning widely shared perceptions among
individuals that speaking up about problems or issues is fruitless and/or even dangerous). Such a
climate will lead to employee silence rather than voice. In this study, we explore how the three
types of organizational factors described by Morrison and Milliken (2000) create a climate of
silence and how this climate, in turn, affects an individual’s decision to report bad news.
4.2.3

Basic Whistle-Blowing Model as Three Decision Steps of Reporting
While the organizational silence literature provides a rich explanation of the

organizational-level antecedents leading to a climate of silence and the effects of employee
silence, it does not specify how an employee decides whether to exercise voice or remain silent.
In this study, we understand that employee silence is a consequence of an employee’s decision to
report or not, and we examine how employees make a decision to report (i.e., voice) or not (i.e.,
silence).

Thus, we integrate the basic whistle-blowing model with the climate of silence

construct and the factors that are believed to underlie it.
Figure 4.1 shows the central decision-making model from the whistle-blowing literature,
which provides the basic theoretical framework of an individual’s reporting decision steps
(Miceli and Near 1992). Dozier and Miceli (1985) argued that once an individual is aware of a
problem (i.e., recognition), he or she assesses whether the status ought to be reported (i.e.,
assessment), then considers whether he or she is responsible for reporting (i.e., responsibility),
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which in turn influences his or her willingness to report (i.e., choice of action). IS researchers
have adopted this model as a general framework of individual decision-making regarding bad
news reporting and have found support for the model in a variety of experimental contexts
(Smith and Keil 2003; Smith et al. 2001). In this study, we adopt the basic decision-making
model from whistle-blowing theory and integrate it with key elements of the organizational
silence model proposed by Morrison and Milliken (2000).
Assessment:
Status ought to be
reported

+

Assessment:
Personal responsibility
to report

+

Willingness
to report

Figure 4.1 Basic Whistle-Blowing Model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985)

In the next section, we describe our research model and hypotheses, which are followed
by a discussion of our methodology and results.

4.3

Research Model
In this study, we empirically investigate the causal relationships among three types of

organizational factors, climate of silence, and decision to report. We have adopted the three types
of organizational factors and the climate of silence construct from Morrison and Milliken’s
(2000) model and the organizational silence literature. In addition, we examine organizational
silence in terms of an individual’s decision to report (i.e., voice) or not (i.e., silence) by
employing the central decision-making model from whistle-blowing theory. Morrison and
Milliken’s model of organizational silence has not been empirically tested by itself or in concert
with the basic whistle-blowing decision model. We explicitly state eight hypotheses
corresponding to the eight paths in the research model, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
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Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
+

H2
+

-

Willingness
to report

-

H3

H4

H5

-

Climate of
Silence

H6
+
Organizational
Structures and
Policies

+

H7

Managerial
Practices

+

H8
Degree of
Demographic
Dissimilarity

Figure 4.2 Research Model
4.3.1

Central Decision-Making Model
The upper row of Figure 4.2 shows the central decision-making model grounded in the

whistle-blowing literature. We adopt two hypotheses in the whistle-blowing model that were
shown to hold in recent research (Keil et al. 2004), and retest them in the research model as a
replication.
The whistle-blowing literature postulates that an individual will make two distinct
assessments of whether information ought to be reported and whether he or she has a personal
responsibility to report it (Dozier and Miceli 1985), but they are inherently related. Other things
being equal, an individual’s stronger assessment that status information ought to be reported will
be reflected in a stronger feeling of personal responsibility for reporting. Thus, we state the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. A stronger assessment that information ought to be communicated will be
reflected in a higher assessed level of personal responsibility for reporting.
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Following the line of argument from the whistle-blowing literature (Miceli and Near
1992), personal responsibility should have a direct effect on willingness to report bad news. In
addition, this causal relationship between personal responsibility and willingness to report has
been empirically tested and confirmed in the IS literature (Keil et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2001).
Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of assessed personal responsibility will be associated with
greater willingness to report bad news.
We now turn to the organizational factors that influence the central decision-making
model.
4.3.2

Climate of Silence
Organizations seem to establish and maintain climates and cultures that support employee

voice or silence. Some empirical work actually shows the relationship between organizational
climate and reporting in the whistle-blowing context. For example, Baucus, Near, and Miceli
(1985) found that people were more likely to report wrongdoing internally than to remain silent
or report it externally when the organizational culture was more supportive of whistle-blowing,
i.e., less retaliatory. Blackburn (1988) and Graham (1986) also suggested that more supportive,
organizational climates would give rise to more whistle-blowing. In addition, Miceli and Near
(1992, p. 158) argued from the literature that organizational climate could affect all of the
decision steps in the basic whistle-blowing model.
Morrison and Milliken (2000) suggest that a climate of silence is characterized by two
shared beliefs. One is that speaking up about problems in the organization is not worth the effort,
and the other is that voicing one’s opinions and concerns is dangerous. They also argue that,
when a climate of silence exists in an organization, its employees’ dominant response will be
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silence rather than voice. While they focused on how and what organizational factors lead to a
climate of silence, they did not specify how a climate of silence leads to employee silence. In this
study, we consider employee silence as an individual’s decision of silence, and adopt the basic
whistle-blowing model (Dozier and Miceli 1985) to understand the individual’s silence decision
steps. Thus, we integrate the climate of silence construct with the basic whistle-blowing model to
understand employee silence.
In the IS literature, organizational climate has been shown to have an indirect effect on an
individual’s willingness to report bad news through the assessment of his/her personal
responsibility to report (Keil et al. 2004). However, its direct effects on the willingness to report
and the assessment of whether the status ought to be reported have not been hypothesized nor
empirically tested before. According to the whistle-blowing literature (Miceli and Near 1992, p.
158-164), organizational climate could affect an individual’s assessment of whether the
wrongdoing ought to be reported. Thus, we state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. When a greater climate of silence is present, individuals are less likely to
assess that negative information ought to be reported.
The whistle-blowing literature suggests that organizational climate can affect an
individual’s assessment of personal responsibility for reporting (Miceli and Near 1992, p. 158).
In addition, based on agency theory and the whistle-blowing literature, Keil and his colleagues
(2004) hypothesized a relationship between organizational climate and personal responsibility
for reporting and found empirical support for it. In this study, we seek to determine if this result
can be replicated with a closely related construct—climate of silence—which we operationalized
based on the organizational silence literature. Thus,
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Hypothesis 4. When a greater climate of silence is present, individuals are less likely to
assess a personal responsibility to report a project’s status.
The effect of organizational climate on choice of action (i.e., willingness to report) in the
whistle-blowing context has been theoretically developed and empirically confirmed (Dozier and
Miceli 1985; Miceli and Near 1992). When an organizational climate of silence exists, it is
believed that the dominant choice within the organization is for employees to withhold their
opinions and concerns about organizational problems (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Thus, a
climate of silence would seem to directly affect an individual’s choice of silence, and we state
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. When a greater climate of silence is present, individuals are less willing to
report bad news.
4.3.3

Three Types of Organizational Factors
While an organizational climate of silence has been discussed as an antecedent of bad

news reporting (Keil et al. 2004), there has been little research on organizational factors that may
contribute to the climate of silence in an organization. Morrison and Milliken (2000) have
developed a theoretical model of organizational silence in which three types of organizational
factors have been identified that contribute to a climate of silence (Morrison and Milliken 2000).
In this research, we examine three types of factors that have been theoretically proposed, but
have not been empirically evaluated to determine their respective influence on both climate of
silence and bad news reporting: organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and
degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers.
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4.3.3.1 Organizational Structures and Policies
Certain organizational structures and policies discourage upward information flow in an
organization. Two such structural features are centralization of decision making and lack of
formal upward feedback mechanisms (Morrison and Milliken 2000). The former means that
managers do not involve employees in decision-making processes because they may believe that
employees are opportunistic and not knowledgeable (Hall 1982). The latter means that the
organization is unlikely to have procedures such as systematic surveying or polling to solicit
employee feedback. This is because there may be a tendency to believe that employee feedback
is of little value or because negative upward feedback may be seen as a challenge to managers
(Morrison and Milliken 2000).
Morrison and Milliken (2000) argue that the two features above can discourage upward
information flow in an organization and lead to a climate of silence. Based on a qualitative study,
Milliken et al. (2003) have proposed an emergent model in which organizational structures and
policies affect the choice to remain silent. However, there has been no empirical research on the
causal relationship between such organizational structures and policies and an organizational
climate of silence. Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. Organizational structures and policies discouraging upward information
flow will lead to a greater climate of silence in the organization.
4.3.3.2 Managerial Practices
Morrison and Milliken (2000) have identified two types of managerial practices that may
impede upward communication in an organization: tendency to reject or respond negatively to
dissent or negative feedback and lack of informal solicitation of negative feedback. These
managerial practices are believed to be related to employee silence. For example, an interviewee
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in an exploratory study of employee silence mentioned, “I raised a concern about some policies
and I was told to shut up … I would have pursued the issue further but presently I can’t afford to
risk my job” (Milliken et al. 2003, p. 1453). This demonstrates, at least anecdotally, that when a
manager rejects or discounts opinions and feedback, it can lead to employee silence.
Additionally, managers who believe that employees are self-interested and ill informed are not
likely to engage in informal feedback seeking from subordinates (Vancouver and Morrison 1995).
In this case, employees may receive some cue that speaking up is not welcome, and withhold
their opinions (Saunders et al. 1992). Thus, both types of managerial practices may contribute to
employee silence (Morrison and Milliken 2000).
According to Morrison and Milliken’s (2000) theoretical model of organizational silence,
the two types of managerial practices above directly contribute to a climate of silence in an
organization. However, the causal relationship between such managerial practices and a climate
of silence has not been empirically investigated before. Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7. Managerial practices impeding upward communication will lead to a
greater climate of silence in the organization.
4.3.3.3 Degree of Demographic Dissimilarity between Employees and Top Managers
According to social identification theory (Tajfel 1978), individuals classify oneself and
others into “us” (i.e., ingroup, those who are perceived as similar) versus “them” (i.e, outgroup,
all the others), based on nationality (Hogg 1996), kinship (Underwood et al. 2001), gender
(Brown 1996), age (Hogg and Terry 2000), language (Deaux 1996), vocation (Underwood et al.
2001), etc. Moreover, individuals tend to identify strongly with the reference group (i.e.,
ingroup) and regard the group as a salient reliable referent of what constitutes acceptable
behaviors and beliefs (Hogg 1996, p. 84). In other words, the similarity-based reference group
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enables individuals to evaluate whether their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors are correct,
and the stronger the feeling that the reference group is similar to him/herself, the stronger is
his/her acceptance of the behaviors and beliefs of the group (Hogg 1996). This also implies that
individuals may expect the group to accept their beliefs and behaviors because of such
similarities. Thus, an individual’s perception of social identity based on similarity may affect his
or her expectation of others’ attitude on his or her behavior. In addition, Hogg and Terry (2000, p.
127) theoretically propose that demographic similarity and dissimilarity affect organizational
behavior.
While the impact of similarity/dissimilarity in social groups on attitude, perception,
intention, and behavior has been studied over 50 years in the social psychology literature
(Robinson 1996), the effect of dissimilarity between top-managers and lower-level employees on
organizational communications has only recently received attention in the organizational silence
literature (Morrison and Milliken 2000). Morrison and Milliken (2000, p. 717) suggest that
“when a large number of employees see that people like themselves are underrepresented at the
top, they may be more likely to conclude that the organization does not value the input of people
like themselves.” Such beliefs may cause individuals to conclude that it would be more risky for
them to voice their concerns or opinions than it would be for employees who are more
demographically similar to those at the top. Taking the above discussions together, it is
reasonable to assume that demographic dissimilarity in terms of ethnicity, age, and gender
between employees and top managers may contribute to an organizational climate of
communications. Thus, we state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8. Degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers
will lead to a greater climate of silence in the organization.
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In summary, while prior research has suggested that organizational factors such as
organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity
between employees and top managers, may lead to a climate of silence, these relationships have
not been empirically tested. Notably, while the effect of an organizational climate has been
discussed in the context of bad news reporting on IT projects (Keil et al. 2004), the full nature of
the relationship between a climate of silence in an organization and bad new reporting has not
been empirically investigated within the rubric of the whistle-blowing model. In this study, we
empirically examine how the three types of organizational factors lead to a climate of silence in
an organization and how the climate of silence exerts its influence in the central decision-making
model from whistle-blowing theory depicted in Figure 4.2.

4.4

Research Methodology
A laboratory experiment based on hypothetical scenarios was conducted to test the causal

relationships between constructs in the research model. This hypothetical scenario approach is a
good methodological option (Straub and Karahanna 1998) because this study aims to evaluate a
subject’s bad news reporting decision across a wide range of IT project situations that exist in
practice. The experiment involved a three-factor, eight-cell design with three exogenous
variables (organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and degree of demographic
dissimilarity between employees and top managers) that were manipulated independently at two
levels. We developed eight treatment scenarios as well as three items for assessing one construct
for which we were unable to identify reliable and valid measures. Four pilot tests were conducted
to refine the treatment scenarios and validate the measures. College students at three large
universities in the southeastern U.S. served as subjects in this process.
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4.4.1

Scenario
Each subject was asked to read a two-page scenario about a troubled, global IT project

called CAPS and to assume the role of a software developer working for a company known as
SSC (see Appendix 4A). Subjects were informed that the CAPS project consisted of several
globally sourced software modules and that they had found a bug in one of the contractor’s
modules, which was not known to others in the project team. Organizational structures/policies,
managerial practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top
managers were manipulated independently to yield eight treatment conditions.
Organizational structures/policies were manipulated by specifying the company’s
structural features. For the non-conducive organizational structure manipulation, the subject was
informed that the company has centralized decision-making and no formal mechanisms for
conveying upward feedback. For the conducive organizational structure manipulation, the
subject was informed that the company has decentralized decision-making and many formal
mechanisms for conveying upward feedback.
Managerial practices were manipulated by specifying the project manager’s
communication practice. For the open communication practice manipulation, the subject was
informed that the project manager tends to accept and respond positively to bad news from
subordinates, and informally seeks negative feedback from subordinates. For the closed
communication practice manipulation, the subject was informed that the project manager tends
to reject and respond negatively to bad news from subordinates, and never informally seeks any
negative feedback from subordinates.
Degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers was
manipulated by specifying similarity or dissimilarity of ethnicity, age, and gender. For the
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demographic similarity manipulation, the subject was informed that the company’s top managers
are very similar to him/her in terms of their ethnicity, and most of them are also close in age to
him/her and of the same gender. For the demographic dissimilarity manipulation, the subject was
informed that the company’s top managers are quite dissimilar from him/her in terms of their
ethnicity, and most of them are also much older than him/her and of the opposite gender.
4.4.2

Procedure
A scenario experiment was conducted in which subjects were told that this was an

experimental study about business decision-making in a global IT project situation and that their
answers would remain anonymous. They were reminded that their participation was voluntary
and those who did not wish to participate in the experiment could leave. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the eight treatment conditions obtained by varying the three types of
organizational factors. The survey procedure consisted of two parts. In the first part, after
subjects completed the informed consent form, they received the scenario corresponding to their
respective treatment condition and were asked to read the scenario. In the second part, subjects
were asked to complete a questionnaire that measured their perceptions of the climate of silence
and also answered several items regarding their willingness to report bad news; their assessments
of whether the information concerning the project ought to be reported; their assessments of
whether they had a personal responsibility to report the information; and a series of manipulation
checks. They were then asked to provide some demographic information.
4.4.3

Subjects
A total of 310 students enrolled in an introductory information systems course at three

large urban universities in the southeastern United States in 2007 were recruited for the study.
Sixty subjects were dropped from the subject pool because they failed the manipulation check or
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did not complete the questionnaire. The mean age of the remaining 250 subjects was 23.9 years
and the mean work experience was 4.24 years. Fifty-five percent of the subjects were male, and
45 percent were female.
While student subjects could limit the generalizability of the results, they are commonly
used in laboratory experiments that explore human decision-making (Harrison and Harrell 1993;
Sitkin and Weingart 1995). Additionally, the use of student subjects as surrogates for managers
has been supported in the literature (DeSanctis 1989; Gordon et al. 1987; Remus 1986),
especially when the decision-making task does not require highly specialized domain knowledge.
In this study, the subjects were asked to adopt the role of a team member in an IT project
situation, not of a leader or a manager. The roles of team members in an IT project were
discussed under the topic of the software development life cycle (SDLC) in the information
systems course that the subjects were taking at the time of data collection. The subjects also had
an average of 4.24 years work experience. Thus, we believe that the subjects were able to
appreciate the context of the IT project scenario and it is reasonable to assume that they could
project themselves into the team member role in the experiment.
4.4.4

Measures
Three measurement items for climate of silence were developed for this study. Morrison

and Milliken (2000) indicate that a climate of silence is characterized by two shared beliefs: (1)
speaking up about problems in the organization is not worth the effort and (2) voicing one’s
opinions and concerns is dangerous. We have adopted their characterization and created two
formative items to measure the climate of silence – ‘My speaking up about the bug would be
worth the effort.’ and ‘My voicing the bug could be dangerous for my career at SSC.’ In addition,
we adopted a third measurement item, ‘If I decide to inform my manager of the bug, SSC’s
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management will react positively to my decision’, which was used and validated as a measure for
perceived organizational climate by Keil et al. (2004).
We also adopted existing multi-item measures for willingness to report bad news (Park et
al. 2006), assessment of whether the project status ought to be reported, and personal
responsibility to report (Smith et al. 2001). Three dichotomous measures were created as
manipulation checks for the three types of organizational factors. All measurement scales were
validated through extensive pilot testing of the experimental materials involving four rounds of
experimentation aimed at fine-tuning the scenario, the manipulations, and the instrumentation.
The willingness to report bad news was measured using three items that were anchored
on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (7). All of the
other multi-item measures were assessed on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Appendix 4B shows the four constructs and the twelve
measures used in this study along with some descriptive statistics.

4.5

Results

4.5.1

Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were employed to insure that subjects exposed to the various

treatments and understood the conditions described in the scenario. In each scenario, we checked
the manipulations for organizational structures/policies by asking ‘SSC’s decision-making
processes are centralized, and SSC has no formal mechanisms for conveying upward feedback
[

True /

False ],’ for managerial practices by asking ‘Your manager tends to accept bad news

from his subordinates, and informally seeks negative feedback from subordinates. [

True /

False ],’ and for degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers by
asking ‘Most top managers at SSC are very similar to you in terms of ethnicity, age, and gender.
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[

True /

False ].’ Subjects who passed the manipulation checks were retained for subsequent

analysis.
4.5.2

Partial Least Squares Analysis
Partial Least Squares 5 (PLS) analysis was used for measurement validation and structural

path estimation in the research model. PLS is an advanced statistical method that allows optimal
empirical assessment of a structural model together with its measurement model. A measurement
model links each construct with its indicators while a structural model represents a network of
causal relationships among multiple constructs in the research model. The measurement model
should be established by examining the psychometric properties of the measures before testing
the structural model.
PLS analysis was considered appropriate for testing a theoretical model in the early
stages of development. This study is an initial attempt to empirically test a new model of bad
news reporting in the IT project context grounded in the literature on organizational silence and
informed by previous work based on whistle-blowing theory. In addition, the component-based
PLS analysis was appropriate for this study because the research model includes a formative
construct, which cannot be dealt with by a covariance-based SEM approach (Chin 1998; Fornell
and Bookstein 1982). PLS analysis has been used in previous bad news reporting studies (Keil et
al. 2004; Park et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2001).
4.5.3

Measurement Model
In the research model, we have two different types of constructs: reflective and formative.

While construct validity, which is typically assessed by convergent and discriminant validity, is
essential for reflective constructs, it is not required for formative constructs because the
5
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indicators within a formative construct do not need to have higher correlations than their
correlations with indicators of other constructs (MacCallum and Browne 1993). In this study, we
do not test convergent validity for one formative construct (i.e., climate of silence) because the
items are actually measuring different aspects of the construct. However, we evaluate
multicollinearity and weights of the formative measures to check their construct validity. We
also examine discriminant validity for the formative measures because we still believe that
significant correlations should exist between heavily contributing aspects to the overall derived
formative construct.
4.5.3.1 Multicollinearity and Validity of Formative Construct – Climate of Silence
For the formative construct included in the research model, which is climate of silence,
we examined multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is not desirable in formative constructs because
it can lead to inflated standard errors and this can have an adverse effect on measurement
reliability. According to a general rule from the literature, a variance inflation factor (VIF) value
above 10 indicates serious multicollinearity (Duman et al. 2006). Recent guidelines suggest that
VIF values for formative measures greater than 3.3 may cause multicollinearity problems
(Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006; Petter et al. 2007). The VIF values in Table 4.1, all of which
are less than 3.3, suggest that the three items for the climate of silence construct explain a certain
unique portion of variance, indicating no sign of multicollinearity.
In addition, we examined weights of three formative items for climate of silence. Based
on the literature, weights of 0.05 or less tend to have little influence on the results (Chin 1998;
Noonan and Wold 1982). As shown in Table 4.1, all the weights are 0.201 or higher and
statistically significant. Thus, the three items are considered predictive of their respective traits,
suggesting that they have adequate validity as formative measures.
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Table 4.1 Variance Inflation Factor and Weights for Formative Scales
Construct

Items

Climate of Silence

COS1
COS2
COS3

Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF)
1.292
1.622
1.694

Weight
0.696 (t = 8.389)
0.201 (t = 2.241)
0.310 (t = 3.038)

4.5.3.2 Convergent Validity
We first examined standardized loadings to test convergent validity of reflective
constructs in the research model. Standardized loadings should be greater than 0.707 to meet the
condition that the shared variance between each measurement item and its latent construct
exceed the error variance. A loading of 0.5 or 0.6 may still be acceptable if other indicators
within the same block have high loadings (Chin 1998). As seen in Table 4.2, all the loadings are
0.804 or higher, and we retained all the indicators in the analysis.
In order to test the internal consistency for each block of measures, we examined
Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted. While there are no
absolute threshold values for Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability, it is suggested that 0.7
indicates extensive evidence of reliability and 0.8 or higher provides exemplary evidence
(Bearden et al. 1993; Yi and Davis 2003). As shown Table 4.2, all three constructs exhibited a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.734 or higher, and composite reliability of 0.847 or higher. As another
measure of construct validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest average variance extracted
(AVE). AVE measures the amount of variance that a latent construct captures from its indicators
relative to the amount of variance from measurement error, and therefore is only applicable to
reflective constructs (Chin 1998, p. 321). AVE of 0.5 or higher is usually acceptable, meaning
that 50 percent or more variance of the indicators is accounted for (Chin 1998). As shown in
Table 4.2, all the AVEs are 0.648 or above. Thus, our evaluations of Cronbach’s alpha,

104

composite reliability, and AVE indicate that construct reliability is above the accepted threshold
and that convergent validity has been established.
Table 4.2 Item Loadings and Reliability for Reflective Scales
Construct

Item

Assessment Status Ought to Be
Reported
Assessment Personal
Responsibility to
Report
Willingness to
Report

Standardized
Loading

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Composite
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted

OTR1

0.804

0.734

0.847

0.648

OTR2

0.804

OTR3

0.807

RTR1

0.887

0.833

0.900

0.749

RTR2

0.856

RTR3

0.853

WTR1

0.916

0.877

0.925

0.804

WTR2

0.930

WTR3

0.842

4.5.3.3 Discriminant Validity
We conducted two tests for discriminant validity. In the first test, we calculated each
indicator’s loading on its own construct and its cross-loading on all other constructs (Chin 1998).
Table 4.3 shows that each construct has higher loadings with its intended indicators than crossloadings with indicators from other constructs. Moreover, each indicator has a higher loading
with its intended construct than a cross-loading with any other construct.
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Table 4.3 Loadings and Cross-Loadings
Construct
1. Climate of Silence
(COS)

Item
COS1
COS2
COS3

1
0.915
0.667
0.740

2
0.289
0.072
0.049

3
0.378
0.174
0.192

4
0.654
0.376
0.419

2. Assessment Status Ought to Be
Reported (OTR)

OTR1
OTR2
OTR3

0.085
0.166
0.270

0.804
0.804
0.807

0.384
0.428
0.503

0.203
0.261
0.365

3. Assessment Personal Responsibility
to Report (RTR)

RTR1
RTR2
RTR3

0.297
0.293
0.334

0.470
0.479
0.488

0.887
0.856
0.853

0.417
0.377
0.464

4. Willingness to Report
(WTR)

WTR1
WTR2
WTR3

0.587
0.600
0.589

0.306
0.288
0.365

0.428
0.469
0.411

0.916
0.930
0.842

Second, we compared average variance extracted for each reflective construct with the
shared variance between all possible pairs of reflective constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Climate of silence has been excluded in this analysis because AVE is not applicable to a
formative construct (Chin 1998). As seen in Table 4.4, the AVE for each construct is higher than
the squared correlation between the construct pairs, which indicates that each latent construct
shares more variance with its block of indicators than with a different block of indicators of other
constructs. Thus, it also establishes discriminant validity among those reflective constructs.

Table 4.4 AVEs versus Squares of Correlations between Constructs
Construct
OTR
RTR
WTR

Average Variance Extracted
(AVE)
0.648
0.749
0.804
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OTR

RTR

WTR

0.307
0.127

0.237

-

4.5.4

Structural Model
The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated by examining the R2 value

of the final dependent construct. The final dependent construct, willingness to report bad news,
had an R2 value of 0.51, indicating that the research model accounts for 51% of the variance in
the dependent variable. As for the R2 values for the intermediate variables in the structural model,
the R2 values for “personal responsibility to report”, “status ought to be reported”, and “climate
of silence” were 0.36, 0.05, and 0.28 respectively, indicating that the R2 values are high enough
to make interpretation of the path coefficients meaningful. In particular, 51% of the variance
explained in the final dependent variable stands as compelling evidence of the research model’s
explanatory power, and is comparable to results obtained in prior studies that have examined
other factors that influence bad news reporting. For example, the previous bad news reporting
studies reported R2 of 0.24 (Smith et al. 2001), 0.38 (Keil et al. 2004), 0.32 (Park et al. 2006),
and 0.51 (Park et al. 2007) for the final dependent variable (i.e., willingness to report bad).
For the structural path estimation, we examined each path’s coefficient and significance
level. We computed path coefficients in the structural model with the entire sample, and
employed the bootstrapping method (with 500 resamples) to obtain the t-values corresponding to
each path (see Figure 4.3). The acceptable t-values for two-tailed tests are 1.96, 2.58, and 3.29 at
the significance levels of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001. The assessment of whether the status ought to be
reported had a direct positive effect on the assessment of personal responsibility to report,
supporting H1 (β = 0.50, p < 0.001). The assessment of personal responsibility to report had a
direct positive effect on the willingness to report bad news, which means that subjects were more
willing to report when they perceived themselves to be personally responsible for reporting the
bad news. Thus, H2 was supported (β = 0.29, p < 0.001). Climate of silence had negative effects
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on the assessment of whether the status ought to be reported (β = -0.23, p < 0.01), the assessment
of personal responsibility to report (β = -0.24, p < 0.001), and the willingness to report bad news
(β = -0.56, p < 0.001), thus supporting H3, H4, and H5. All three types of organizational factors
had a significant effect on climate of silence: organizational structures/polices (β = 0.14, p <
0.01), managerial practices (β = 0.48, p < 0.001), and degree of demographic dissimilarity
between employees and top managers (β = 0.18, p < 0.001), thus supporting H6, H7, and H8.
R2 = 0.05
Assessment –
status ought to be
reported

R2 = 0.36
Assessment –
personal responsibility
to report

H1
0.50
(t = 8.61)

H3

H4

-0.23
(t = 3.02)
R2 = 0.28

-0.24
(t = 4.45)

R2 = 0.51

H2
0.29
(t = 5.38)

H5

Willingness to
report

-0.56
(t = 11.49)

Climate of
Silence

H8

H6
0.14
(t = 2.67)
Organizational
Structures /
Policies

0.48
(t = 7.94)

H7

0.18
(t = 3.36)

Managerial
Practices

Degree of
Demographic
Dissimilarity

Figure 4.3 Structural Model

4.5.5

Safeguarding Against and Assessing Common Method Bias
In order to examine the existence of common method bias, we conducted a latent variable

approach that involves adding a first-order factor with all of the measures in the research model
as indicators (Podsakoff et al. 2003). A common method factor was therefore added to the
research model (Liang et al. 2007), and the results demonstrate that the average substantively
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explained variance of the indicators is 0.733, whereas the average method-based variance is
0.025. The ratio of substantive variance to method variance is 29:1. Thus, given the small
magnitude of method variance, the common method bias is unlikely to be a serious concern in
this study.

4.6

Discussion and Implications
This study demonstrates that organizational factors can generate a climate of silence in an

organization, which in turn has a significant effect on an employee’s bad news reporting
behavior. The organizational climate of silence affects an individual’s willingness to report both
directly and indirectly through the assessments of whether the status ought to be reported and
whether the individual has personal responsibility to report. More specifically, individuals are
less likely to assess that the status information ought to be reported and that they have personal
responsibility to report when a climate of silence is more dominant in the organization. In
addition, a greater climate of silence directly lowers an individual’s willingness to report bad
news. Our results are consistent with Miceli and Near’s (1992, p. 158) theoretical argument that
organizational climates could affect all three decision steps, and empirically confirm that a
climate of silence can affect an individual’s bad news reporting.
Three types of organizational factors--organizational structures/policies, managerial
practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers--were
operationalized and tested. The results show that the organizational climate of silence is affected
by all three types of organizational factors and that managerial practices have the strongest effect
– roughly 2.5 times greater than demographic dissimilarity and roughly 3.5 times greater than
organizational structures/policies. In terms of organizational structures/policies, employees tend
to perceive a greater climate of silence when the organization has a centralized decision-making
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feature and no formal mechanisms for upward feedback. In terms of managerial practices,
employees will feel a greater climate of silence when their managers respond negatively to bad
news and do not informally seek negative feedback from subordinates. As for degree of
demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers, employees tend to perceive a
greater climate of silence when they feel that top managers are more different from themselves in
terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. These findings are consistent with Morrison and Milliken’s
(2000) theoretical argument of the three types of organizational factors leading to employ silence,
and empirically confirm the core of their organizational silence model.
One interesting finding in the results is the low R2 (= 0.05) on the assessment of whether
the status information ought to be reported, in comparison with previous bad news reporting
studies that have focused solely on situational and personal factors – 0.31 (Smith et al. 2001),
0.22 (Park et al. 2006), and 0.35 (Park et al. 2007). This may imply that personal and situational
factors have a greater influence than organizational factors in shaping an individual’s perception
of whether something ought to be reported. This makes sense because people may evaluate the
seriousness of the current status based on the situation involved and their personal levels of
accepting the seriousness, rather than an organizational climate in general. In addition, in
comparison with prior research including situational and personal factors, climate of silence
(which represents an organizational factor) in this study has the highest path coefficient (= -0.56)
and t-value (= 11.49) on the willingness to report bad news. This may imply that organizational
factors have different roles from situational and personal factors in the bad news reporting
decision. That is, situational and personal factors are more likely to affect an employee’s
assessment of whether something ought to be reported, whereas an organizational factor is more
likely to affect an employee’s willingness to report bad news (i.e., behavioral intention).
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4.6.1

Limitations of the Study
While the laboratory experiment approach provides a highly controlled environment for

hypothesis testing, it could have some methodological limitations. First, our experiment is based
on written, hypothetical scenarios to represent a real world context. While we tried to make the
scenarios as realistic as possible by controlling extraneous factors and providing only the
essential information needed for role-playing and decision-making, there may be other
exogenous factors that can influence an individual’s bad news reporting. Second, in our
experiment, the subjects were provided with a necessarily simplified view of the options
available to one who faces the decision of whether and how to report bad news. While we framed
the situation as a choice of whether or not to report the bad news to the manager in the
experiment, the project member can make other choices in responding to such a situation, such
as trying to contact the global contractor who is responsible for the bug or delaying bad news
reporting. Third, we measured a subject’s behavioral intention rather than actual behavior. There
is no guarantee that the subject would actually behave as he or she indicated. In spite of these
limitations, the significant relationships among the constructs in the research model and its
explanatory power shed new light on bad news reporting.
4.6.2

Research Contributions
This study contributes to research in several ways. First, we extended the bad news

reporting model by empirically examining the three types of organizational factors derived from
the organizational silence literature. The three types of organizational factors are grounded in
theory, but this is the first study to empirically test them. All three types of organizational factors
were found to contribute significantly to a climate of silence. Clearly, incorporating the
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organizational factors allowed us to construct a richer model of bad news reporting, and will
provide a solid foundation for future research.
We also extended the organizational silence model by combining it with the central
decision-making model from whistle-blowing theory. While the organizational silence literature
focuses on the antecedents and consequences of employee silence, it does not deal with the
underlying decision steps associated with employee silence. In this study, we integrated the
central decision-making model (i.e., three decision steps of reporting) from whistle-blowing
theory with key constructs from the organizational silence literature and found that a climate of
silence affects employee silence by influencing all three decision steps.
Another significant contribution is our operationalization of the climate of silence
construct and hypothesizing and examining its effect on the three decision steps of bad news
reporting. The climate of silence has been discussed in the organizational silence literature as a
construct that may play an important role in the employee silence, but its measurement has not
been discussed. In this study, we have developed and validated a three-item formative measure
for climate of silence that is grounded in the organizational silence literature.
Finally, we empirically re-confirmed strong and significant relationships among
willingness to report and its antecedents in the central decision-making model derived from
whistle blowing theory. In particular, our results had very high explanatory power (R2 = 0.51) for
the willingness to report, as compared to previous studies.
4.6.3

Implications for Practitioners
The significant effect of organizational structures and policies on a climate of silence is

meaningful in the organizational context because it means that companies can mitigate
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employees’ perceptions of climate of silence and promote their bad news reporting by involving
them in decision-making processes and providing more formal communication channels.
Employees are more willing to report bad news when managers tend to respond
positively to bad news and informally seek negative feedback from subordinates. Managers can
take advantage of this by encouraging their employees to report potential issues and problems
and by responding in a manner that reinforces the value of open communication.
Many of today’s companies are composed of individuals from diverse backgrounds. This
is especially true of global companies. In establishing promotion practices, managers at such
companies should consider the fact that gross demographic dissimilarities between employees
and top managers may have a chilling effect on upward communication, particularly bad news
reporting.
Managers wanting to put an end to organizational silence should begin by placing
primary emphasis on managerial practices as these appear to have the most significant effect.
While the other two areas—organizational structure/policies and degree of demographic
dissimilarity—can also play a significant role in establishing a climate of silence, their effect
appears to be comparatively weaker than that of managerial practices. That being said, it is
important to note that all three types of factors represent areas over which management has a
high degree of control. Thus, managers should carefully assess their own organizational climate
and determine if adjustments are needed in one or more of these three areas.
4.6.4

Directions for Future Research
While our study is the first to confirm the effect of three types of organizational factors

on a climate of silence, there may be other organizational factors that can also affect a climate of
silence in an organization. Thus, identifying and empirically testing other organizational factors
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and their roles in employee silence represents a worthwhile goal for future research and may
allow further extension of the organizational silence model. For example, organization size,
organizational code of ethics, and industry have been discussed as potential organizational
factors that can affect an individual’s bad news reporting (Miceli and Near 1992).
Morrison and Milliken (2000) have also suggested that employees’ interactions and
communications among themselves can moderate the relationship between organizational factors
and employee silence, but this has not yet been tested. In addition, the recursive relationship in
the organizational silence model, whereby an employee’s silence can affect another employee’s
silence, has not been empirically investigated.
Another promising avenue for future research is the investigation of cross-cultural
differences (Hofstede 1980) and their impact on bad news reporting. Tan et al. (2003) investigate
the impact of organizational climate and information asymmetry in an individualistic and
collectivistic culture, and Keil, Im, and Mahring (2007) investigate the culturally constituted
views of face saving on bad news reporting. These studies, however, were neither grounded in
the organizational silence literature, nor did they investigate the phenomenon within the rubric of
the basic whistle-blowing model. Further research is needed to empirically examine crosscultural differences such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity,
and their impact on organizational silence. Understanding cross-cultural differences is critical to
the success of a global company and would provide useful guidance to managers working on
global software projects.
Another direction for future research would be to extend this study by examining the subfactors of the three organizational factors. While each of the three factors have two or more subfactors by itself (i.e., centralization of decision-making and lack of formal upward feedback
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mechanism for organizational structures/policies, tendency to reject or respond negatively to
dissent or negative feedback and lack of informal solicitation of negative feedback for
managerial practices, and gender, ethnicity, and age for demographic dissimilarity), this study
examined each organizational factor as a whole by manipulating its sub-factors together as a unit.
For example, however, gender, ethnicity, and age can play a different role in an individual’s
perception of organizational climate of silence. Thus, such future research could extend Morrison
and Milliken’s theoretical model of organizational silence, in which the sub-factors have been
aggregated with their parent factors, by shedding light on the interactions and roles of the subfactors in the organizational silence context.
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Appendix 4A. Experimental Scenario and Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS: The business case that follows is part of a study that examines business
decision-making. Please take a few minutes to read over the case and to answer the
questionnaire that follows. There are no right or wrong answers.

Software Solutions Corporations
You work as a software developer for Software Solutions Corporation (SSC), a global
computer software integrator based in Seattle, Washington that specializes in putting together
software components to meet specific customer needs. You are working on a project called
CAPS which consists of several modules that have been contracted out to different firms. You
are working in SSC’s Atlanta office to integrate various modules for the CAPS project.
Contractors for the various modules that make up CAPS are located in different areas around the
world. The figure below shows your place in the organizational structure.

116

The SSC software developers, including you, have a monthly meeting with the project
manager at the SSC headquarters in Seattle. You came back from the monthly meeting
yesterday, and began to work on integration testing across the modules in the project. Today,
you accidentally discovered a small bug in one module that a contractor in India is responsible
for. You have no way of finding out exactly who the contractor is or how to contact them
directly. You won’t see your project manager for another whole month until the next monthly
meeting in Seattle. In deciding whether or not to report the small bug to your project manager,
you are considering several factors below that may influence your decision.
One structural feature of your company is high decentralization of decision making,
and therefore managers in your company usually involve their subordinates in their decisionmaking processes. In addition, your company has many formal mechanisms for conveying
upward feedback including a web-based reporting system, and you can use the formal webbased reporting system to report any concerns to the project manager at any time.
From past experience, you know that your project manager tends to accept and respond
positively to bad news from subordinates. In addition, your manager informally seeks
negative feedback from subordinates.
While SSC is a global company, its top managers are very similar to you in terms of
their ethnicity. Most of them are also close in age to you and of the same gender.
At this point, you are wondering whether or not you should immediately report the
small bug you found to your project manager.
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The above scenario represents the treatment used to manipulate non-strict organizational
structure, open communication practice, and demographic similarity. The treatment for strict
organizational structure is identical except for the third paragraph, which the following
paragraph is substitute for:

One structural feature of your company is high centralization of decision making, and
therefore managers in your company completely exclude their subordinates from their decisionmaking processes. In addition, aside from the monthly meeting your company has no formal
mechanisms for conveying upward feedback, and you therefore have no officially sanctioned
channel to report any concerns to the project manager.

The treatment for closed communication practice is identical except for the fourth paragraph,
which the following paragraph is substitute for:
From past experience, you know that your project manager tends to reject and respond
negatively to bad news from subordinates. In addition, your manager never informally seeks
any negative feedback from subordinates.

The treatment for demographic dissimilarity is identical except for the fifth paragraph, which the
following paragraph is substitute for:
118

Because SSC is a global company, its top managers are quite dissimilar from you in
terms of their ethnicity. Most of them are also much older than you and of the opposite gender.
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Appendix 4B. Constructs, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics
Willingness to Report Bad News
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely)
WTR1

5.17

1.59 Please indicate your willingness to IMMEDIATELY (i.e., RIGHT
NOW) report the bad news to your boss.

WTR2

5.10

1.56 At this time, how likely are you to go directly to your boss by
yourself to report the bad news concerning the project’s status?

WTR3
(reversed)

5.38

1.51 Please indicate how likely it is that you would avoid telling your boss
the bad news.

Assessment of Responsibility to Report
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
RTR1

5.52

1.12 I believe that I have a personal responsibility to make more
information about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

RTR2
(reversed)

5.45

1.30 I believe that it is not my responsibility to make more information
about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

RTR3

5.34

1.26 I believe that it is my personal duty to tell my boss about the project’s
status.

Assessment of Whether Something Ought to Be Reported
Variable
Mean s.d. Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)
OTR1

5.87

0.87 I believe that something should be done to make more information
about the status of the CAPS project known to my boss.

OTR2
(reversed)

5.69

0.98 I don’t believe that it really matters whether more information about
the status of the CAPS project is made known to my boss.

OTR3

5.97

0.97 Even if it is not me, I believe someone should tell my boss about the
status of the CAPS project.

Climate of Silence
Variable
Mean s.d.

Item Wording (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)

COS1

5.41

1.42 My speaking up about the bug would be worth the effort.

COS2
(reversed)

4.40

1.58 My voicing the bug could be dangerous for my career at SSC.

COS3

4.25

1.56 If I decide to inform my manager of the bug, SSC’s management will
react positively to my decision.
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Construct Correlation Table
WTR
RTR
WTR

1

RTR

0.484**

1

OTR

0.344**

0.546**

OTR

COS

1

COS
0.587**
0.299**
0.150*
1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1

Revisit: Motivation and Objective
Motivated by a case study of IT project failure in which a project member’s reluctance to

report bad news appeared to lead to project failure, this dissertation raised the following
questions to achieve the research objective of better understanding an individual’s bad news
reporting behavior in the IT project context:
Why do people not report problems associated with IT projects?
How do people decide whether or not to report problems?
To answer these research questions, this dissertation research drew upon the literature of
the MUM effect, whistle-blowing, and organizational silence to develop an overall model of bad
news reporting, which adopted the basic whistle-blowing model to understand an individual’s
reporting decision steps and categorized the influential factors on bad new reporting into three
different levels – personal factors (i.e., individual-level factors), situational factors (i.e., projectlevel factors), and organizational factors.
In order to determine whether the overall model makes sense and is useful, I conducted
three empirical, experimental studies varying the influential factors at three different levels
within the rubric of the basic whistle-blowing model. The results of the three studies are detailed
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
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5.2

Contributions to Research and Practice
This dissertation makes several contributions to both research and practice. While those

contributions were highlighted in the end of each chapter, the overall contributions of the
dissertation can be stated as follows.
One important contribution of this dissertation is that it offers a multilevel view on the
influential factors in bad news reporting. This dissertation has reviewed and synthesized the
literature related to bad news reporting, categorized the influential factors into three different
levels, and suggested an overall model of an individual’s bad news reporting behavior. Moreover,
this dissertation empirically tests and confirms the multilevel view with three independent
experiments by examining factors at three levels – personal, situational, and organizational
factors.
Each of the three studies contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a
theoretically grounded model. Study One was the first to examine personal factors in the bad
news reporting context. Study Two completed the empirical testing of Smith and Keil’s (2003)
theoretical model by investigating the role of time urgency in the bad news reporting context.
Study Three integrated the organizational silence model with whistle-blowing theory to shed
light on the relationships between organizational factors and bad news reporting. In addition, the
three studies re-confirmed the three reporting decision steps in the basic whistle-blowing model
and empirically demonstrated how the factors at different levels can interact with the three
decision steps.
While several contributions to practice have been discussed in the individual chapters,
one overall practical contribution of this dissertation is that it can help practitioners better
understand an employee’s bad news reporting behavior in the IT project context. By dealing with
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those factors at different levels encouraging or discouraging bad new reporting, companies can
avoid IT project failure that may be caused by employee silence.

5.3

Limitations and Future Research
While methodological limitations have been discussed in each of the three studies, there

may be some contextual limitations across the three studies. In this dissertation, any one study
has not tested all factors at three levels together. Although all three levels were not tested
together in this dissertation, the findings from the three studies may provide some implications
for testing all three levels in one research model. First, the assessment of whether the status
ought to be reported, i.e., the first antecedent in the basic whistle-blowing model, has higher
values of R2 when personal and situational factors are involved than when organizational factors
are involved. Second, personal and organizational factors yield stronger path coefficients to the
assessment of personal responsibility to report than do situational factors. Third, organizational
factors have stronger path coefficients to the willingness to report than do personal or situational
factors. The three findings indicate that each level factor plays a different role in shaping the bad
new reporting. For example, while personal and situational factors affect the willingness to
report indirectly through the decision steps in the basic whistle-blowing model, organizational
factors are more likely to directly affect the willingness to report, i.e., the final dependent
variable. This may imply that managers can control their employees’ bad news reporting
decision more directly and effectively by manipulating certain organizational factors. Despite
this possible speculation based on the findings in this dissertation, it would be very interesting as
a future research venue that all three level factors are examined and compared together in one
research model. Such future research may be able to address different roles and contributions of
the three level factors in IT project reporting.

124

Another promising avenue for future research would be to examine the basic whistle
blowing model in more detail to determine if the relationship between “ought” to report and
“willingness” to report is fully mediated by “personal responsibility” to report, or whether this
relationship is only partially mediated. In this dissertation, the decision steps have been simply
adopted from the whistle-blowing theory and tested as given. However, the possibility of a
partially mediated relationship cannot be ruled out based on the analysis performed in this
dissertation. In a post-hoc analysis, a mediation test was performed for each of the three studies
(Baron and Kenny 1986). The results suggest that the relationship between “ought” and
“willingness” is one that is partially mediated, but not fully mediated, by “personal
responsibility.” Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research would be to theoretically
develop and empirically confirm the partially mediated relationship among the three decision
steps in the basic whistle-blowing model.

5.4

Conclusion
Motivated by the issue of reluctance to report bad news in the IT project context and the

lack of a systematic approach to understanding an individual’s bad news reporting behavior, this
dissertation suggested an overall, hierarchical model of bad news reporting, building upon the
literature of the MUM effect, whistle-blowing, and organizational silence. Three empirical,
experimental studies were conducted to determine whether the overall, hierarchical model makes
sense and is useful. The three empirical studies 1) identified such factors at three different levels
(individual, project, and organization) that influence an individual’s bad news reporting, 2)
confirmed the steps through which an individual makes a decision of reporting or not, within the
rubric of the basic whistle-blowing model, and 3) demonstrated the ways in which those factors
interact with the reporting decision steps. In addition, the empirical studies showed that the
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hierarchical view can help researchers reach better explanations of the relationship between bad
news reporting and factors at different levels. Overall, this dissertation contributes by 1)
providing the multilevel approach to understand factors affecting bad news reporting in the IT
project context, 2) testing the effects of the factors at different levels that were theoretically
suggested, but empirically not examined in the literature, 3) providing new validated measures
(e.g., climate of silence), and 4) providing managers with a variety of clues for dealing with their
employees’ bad news reporting behaviors.
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